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MORAL EXPERTISE, MARGINALISATION, & DEFERENCE
Grace Boey
Supervisors: Errol Lord, Lisa Miracchi, Daniel Singer

In this dissertation, I make the broad case against overestimating the moral
epistemic capacities of adult moral agents, and the demands placed upon them to
figure things out for themselves, morally speaking.
This work is split into three chapters. In Chapter 1, ‘Moral Expertise &
Experience’, I argue that moral expertise in some moral sub-domain, or one’s
competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant features
within that moral sub-domain, is typically generated through experience with the
concrete world. I reject the claim that moral philosophers are the best candidates for
being moral experts, and that imagination provides us an equally good path towards
moral expertise as experiences does.
In Chapter 2, 'Moral Expertise on Oppression', I argue that oppressed group
members are often in a better position to become a moral expert with respect to the
type of oppression experienced by that group. For instance, women are in a better
position to become moral experts with respect to the moral sub-domain of sexism, as
opposed to men.
In Chapter 3, ‘Virtuous & Worthy Moral Deference’, I vindicate the practice of
deference to second-hand moral testimony, and agents who defer, in the face of what
I call the ‘reasons unresponsiveness observation’. This is because in certain contexts,
it’s important for them to be motivated by a concern for doing the right thing in
itself. Pure moral deference, practiced in the right way, can allow us to exercise
virtues, and act with moral worth.
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Introduction
Many of us strive to better ourselves as moral agents. This process begins at
childhood, where we learn by example and instruction from authority figures. At
this stage, we are often told what's right and wrong, and learn by accepting the
moral testimony of our parents and teachers. As we progress through childhood and
adolescence, we typically become better at figuring out what's right and wrong on
our own, and learn how to successfully navigate increasingly complex situations.
And once we reach adulthood, it's commonly thought that we become fully fledged
moral agents.
A common intuition is that once we become adults, the onus is then on us to
figure things out by ourselves, morally speaking. It becomes less palatable, or even
taboo, to simply take someone else's word about what's right or wrong, as we did
when we were children. For example, consider the following case:

Vegetarian. Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realised that
it raises some moral issues. She knows lots of empirical facts about animals and
farming. But rather than thinking further about these, she talks to a friend, who
tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally
trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is
wrong. (Adapted from Hills 2009, 94)
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Assuming that eating meat is indeed wrong, it looks like Eleanor’s friend is more
morally competent than her at forming moral knowledge - at least with respect to
the matter of eating meat, and perhaps animal ethics in general. Still, assuming that
Eleanor is an adult, many will find something suspicious, or undesirable, about what
she's done. As an adult moral agent, the onus is on Eleanor to think through these
issues for herself.
Eleanor's engaged in the epistemic practice of what's been called pure moral
deference. This is the practice of forming and sustaiing some moral belief solely based
on someone else's purely moral testimony What makes this 'pure', rather than
'impure', moral deference is that the testimony and deference is of an entirely moral,
non-empirical nature. Assume that Eleanor knows all the relevant empirical facts
that make eating meat wrong, including facts about animal suffering, the factory
farming system, and so on. What she's lacking is competence at putting these pieces
of the moral puzzle together. So, the new belief she accepts is purely moral, and isn't
formed or sustained on the basis of any empirical information she lacks.
The Vegetarian case might make one think that pure moral deference is
impermissible or undesirable. But the intuition becomes less compelling once we
think about cases like these two:

Halloween. Joel is attending an Intro to Ethics recitation. The class is discussing
the ethics of Halloween costumes, which he’s never thought about before.
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Because Joel has a history midterm right after class, he isn’t paying attention.
Rather, he’s reciting historical facts about minstrel shows in his head. At the
very end of class, Joel hears his TA state that her own view is that donning
blackface for Halloween is wrong. Joel leaves class having no clue why his
anyone would hold this view. He also has no feelings about either blackface
or minstrely. He knows they upset the African American community, but
thinks everything seems to upset someone anyway. Still, he believes his TA,
and trusts her too. Whenever she’s explained her moral views in the past, he’s
always been able to grasp her explanations, and has always agreed with her
conclusions. Joel, a white man, decides not to paint his face black and dress
up as Black Panther for Halloween. When asked why, Joel sighs and says, ‘It
would be wrong. I'm not sure why, but my TA said so.’

Ableism. Kim is an able-bodied person. Alex, her good friend, uses a
wheelchair as both his legs are permanently injured. Kim knows that ableism
is wrong, is committed to eliminating it, and is able to identify some obvious
instances of it on her own. But on numerous occasions over their twenty year
friendship, she’s had to rely on Alex to explain other instances of ableism to
her.
Fortunately, Kim has always grasped Alex’s patient explanations, and has
always come to agree with his conclusions. This process has sometimes taken
her many days, or even weeks. But she’s always eventually seen the light,
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even if she’s initially disagreed. Kim has also come to know lots of descriptive
facts about how Alex has to navigate the world. Less fortunately, Kim still
hasn’t managed to become much better at identifying ableism on her own.
One day, Alex complains to Kim that his new boss has started pushing
him around, without asking him if he needs help. Kim doesn’t see how this is
ableist. Alex tries to explain how this undermines his bodily autonomy, but
after five minutes, Kim still doesn’t get it. She refuses to believe Alex.

Although something seems off about Joel in Halloween, there still seems to be
something good about what he's done. As for Kim in Ableism, she seems to have
strong reason to take Alex's moral testimony that pushing him around without his
permission is ableist. In fact, we might think that Kim is required to do so, and that
it's morally and epistemically wrong for her to refuse.
The broad aim of this dissertation is to show how cases like Halloween are
good, and how there is something desirable about what Joel has done. It also aims to
motivate the thought that agents similar to Alex and Kim are quite common, where
one's moral sensitivities are heightened or blunted depending on one's social status
and experiences with being marginalised. Ultimately, the dissertation makes the case
against overestimating the moral epistemic capacities of adult moral agents, and the
demands placed upon them to figure things out for themselves.
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The dissertation is split into three chapters. Chapter 1, 'Moral Expertise &
Experience', argues that moral expertise is typically generated through experience
with the concrete world. I argue that moral expertise in some moral sub-domain, or
one’s competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant
features within that moral sub-domain, is typically generated through experience
with the concrete world. I reject the claim that moral philosophers are the best
candidates for being moral experts, and that imagination provides us an equally
good path towards moral expertise as experiences does.
In Chapter 2, 'Moral Expertise on Oppression', I argue that oppressed group
members are often in a better position to become a moral expert with respect to the
type of oppression experienced by that group. For instance, women are in a better
position to become moral experts with respect to the moral sub-domain of sexism, as
opposed to men. And in Ableism, Alex is in a better position to become a moral
expert with respect to the moral sub-domain of ableism, as opposed to Kim.
In Chapter 3, ‘Virtuous & Worthy Moral Deference’, I vindicate the practice of
pure moral deference, and agents who defer, in the face of what I call the ‘reasons
unresponsiveness observation’. This is because in certain contexts, it’s important for
them to be motivated by a concern for doing the right thing in itself. In particular, I’ll
argue for the following claim:

The contextual claim about moral worth: In contexts C where an agent’s
unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes her
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incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons, her act of ϕ-ing has
moral worth if and only if (i) she’s motivated to ϕ by a concern for doing the
right thing, and (ii) she’s competent at ϕ-ing based on this concern.

I’ll also argue for the existence of the following two virtues:

The virtue of acting for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using her
concern for doing the right thing to perform right actions, in contexts where
because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using
her concern for doing the right thing to form moral knowledge, in contexts
where because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

Pure moral deference, practiced in the right way, is a way for agents to meet the
standards of the contextual claim. This allows them to exercise virtues, and act with
moral worth.
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Chapter 1
Moral Expertise & Experience

1

Introduction

In navigating our everyday lives, we rely on others all the time. One way we do this
is by relying on the expertise of others. We rely on experts in fields like science, math,
medicine, engineering, and other fields. We do so in seeing the doctor, trusting that
the bridge beneath us won’t fall apart, trusting the translations in travel guidebooks,
and calling the plumber when our sink malfunctions. In relying on the expertise of
others, we recognise that they have skills and knowledge that we lack. We also
recognise that experts can be trusted to deploy these skills and knowledge to achieve
outcomes we’d unable to accomplish on our own. Reliance on the expertise of others
is seen as a legitimate means of navigating the world.
Are there such things as moral experts and moral expertise? To some, the
existence of experts and expertise in the moral domain might seem intuitively much
less plausible that the existence of experts in non-evaluative domains like medicine.
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There are several reasons why one might be skeptical of moral expertise. One is that
experts are those to whom we ought to defer, and it seems strange to defer to anyone
about morality. Indeed, there’s a lively philosophical debate about the permissibility
of practicing moral deference. However, most participants in the debate don’t deny
that moral expertise exists, and locate the shortcomings of moral deference
elsewhere.1 Another reason one might be skeptical is that moral truths are a priori.
Since moral truths are in principle equally available to all of us, no one has any
special claim on moral knowledge. Yet, there is no reason to think that everyone is
equally well-positioned to grasp truths in a priori domains. We recognise, for
instance, the existence of experts in mathematics (McGrath 2009; 2011a). One might
deny the existence of moral experts by being an anti-realist about moral facts. If there
are no objective mind-independent moral facts, then the concept of moral expertise
makes no sense. I take it, however, that moral realism isn’t something many of us
want to give up so easily.2
Of course, these don’t exhaust the reasons why one might resist the idea of
moral expertise. Still, many agree that moral expertise can and does exist. I shall
follow suit, and assume that it does. The aim of this chapter, then, is to answer new
questions that arise once we acknowledge the existence of moral expertise. What do

1

Philosophers have noted, for instance, that moral deference bypasses moral understanding
(Hills 2009), virtue (Hills 2009, Howell 2014, Lord 2017), and appreciative knowledge (Lord
2017). McGrath (2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b) argues that the problem is epistemic, because
moral experts are difficult for non-experts to identify.
2
It has also been argued that moral expertise is still compatible with non-realist positions
like relativism (Jones & Schroeter 2018, 463-464).
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moral experts look like? And how does moral expertise come about?
Relatively recent work on moral expertise by Driver, Jones, Schroeter, and
others paints a combined and compelling picture with at least features.3 (1) First,
moral expertise is typically generated through experience. This stands in contrast
with one common image of the moral expert who deliberates and delivers moral
advice from the armchair—in other words, the image of moral experts as moral
philosophers. (2) Second, moral expertise typically exists locally to moral subdomains such as friendship, justice, the ethical status of killings, and so on. Moral
experts aren’t typically experts about ‘morality in general’. (3) Third, moral expertise
isn’t always action guiding. We shouldn’t expect moral experts to only deliver allthings-considered judgments about what is right and wrong. Rather, we should allow
for the deliverances of expert judgments about what’s, for instance, cruel or
oppressive, or what counts as murder.
I find these claims plausible and compelling. I argue, however, that what’s
missing from the current picture is a sufficiently detailed account of claim (1)—the
claim that moral expertise is typically generated through experience. This claim is
crucial to the picture, because claims (2) and (3) follow directly from it. Without a
detailed story of precisely how and why particular experiences put one in an
especially good position to develop moral expertise, the entire picture of moral
expertise is vulnerable.

3

See Jones & Schroeter (2012; 2018), Driver (2006; 2013), and less recently, Jones (1999).
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Following this, the main aim of this paper will be to justify the claim that
moral expertise is typically generated through experience. But in the process of
doing so, this paper will also cut across other important issues and debates. For
instance, I will reject the claim that moral philosophers are the best candidates for
being experts in moral judgment. I will also de-emphasise the role of necessary
moral truths for moral expertise, and argue that we should require moral experts to
be good at gaining contingent moral knowledge about the actual world. And
although I invoke sentimentalist perceptualism in my argument for how experience
is important, I reject what some sentimentalist perceptualists (and many other
philosophers) have recently claimed, or at least implied. This is the claim that
engaging in imagination provides an equally good path towards moral expertise as
experience provides.
Here’s the plan. In Section 2, I’ll introduce the question of whether moral
philosophers count as moral experts, disambiguate between several forms of moral
expertise, and define moral expertise and moral experts in judgment, which are the
targets of my discussion. In Section 3, I’ll outline what I call the ‘non-intellectualist’
picture of moral expertise painted by Driver, Jones, & Schroeter. First, I’ll give a brief
overview of the current literature. Second, I’ll argue that non-intellectualists about
moral expertise should also accept that moral experts must be good at making
contingent moral judgments, and that their skill at making necessary moral
judgments is much less important. Third, I’ll argue that non-intellectualists need to
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do more to justify the role of experience.
In Section 4, I’ll show how experience puts agents in good positions to acquire
moral expertise, and eventually become a moral expert. In doing so, I invoke the
moral epistemic view of sentimentalist perceptualism. In short, experience is good at
causally prompting affective moral perceptions, causing contingent moral
judgments, and causing moral adjustment over time. I propose that this plausibly
gives rise to a form of moral perceptual learning. In Section 5, I consider the claim
that imagination is as good a means towards become a moral expert as experience. I
argue that imagination in both the form of thought experiments as well as narrative
fiction are inferior as compared to concrete experience with the real world.

2

Moral expertise & moral experts

2.1 Are moral philosophers moral experts?
One appealing line of thought is that moral philosophers are good candidates for
being moral experts, and that moral expertise arises from philosophical training in
ethics. Several philosophers have described themselves as moral experts (e.g. see
Singer 1972a; Singer & Wells 1984; Crosthwaite 1995; Føllesdal 2004). Portraying
what I’ll call the ‘intellectualist’ picture of moral expertise, Singer lists the
advantages that moral philosophers have over ‘the ordinary man’:
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‘Is the ordinary man just as likely to be expert in moral matters as the moral
philosopher? … The moral philosopher does have some important
advantages over the ordinary man. First, his general training as a philosopher
should make him more than ordinarily competent in argument and in the
detection of invalid inferences. Next, his specific experience in moral
philosophy gives him an understanding of moral concepts and the logic of
moral argument. … Finally, there is the simple fact that the moral philosopher
can, if he wants, think full-time about moral issues, while most other people
have some occupation to pursue which interferes with such reflection. … If
we are to make moral judgments on some basis other than our unreflective
intuitions, we need time, both for collecting facts and for thinking about it.
Moral philosophers have, then, certain advantages which could make them,
relative to those who lack these advantages, experts in matters of
morals.’ (Singer 1972a, 117)

There is certainly something to what Singer says. Schwitzgebel also notes that a
number of philosophers have also asserted that professional training helps protect
them from unconscious and unwanted biases in their domain of expertise (see e.g.
Grundmann 2010; Hoffman 2010; Williamson 2011; Wright 2010; from Schwitzgebel
2012, 3).
It would be nice if all this was true. Moral philosophers had better count as
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experts in something to do with morality, otherwise it is unclear what their enterprise
counts for. Unfortunately, things are less rosy and more complicated than they seem.
First, empirical research suggests—embarrassingly—that professional ethicists
appear to behave no differently from non-ethicists of similar social background
(Schwitzgebel & Rust 2016). Second, professional philosophers, including ethicists,
appear to be no less subject to framing and order effects in moral problem-solving
than academics in non-philosophy fields (Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2015; 2012).
Third, reading between Singer’s lines makes it clear that he thinks being intelligent
and having superior cognitive abilities are necessary for being a moral expert. Yet
research suggests that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are prone to larger
bias blind spots than average (West, Meserve & Stanovich, 2012). These last two
points are especially threatening to the idea that philosophical training protects
moral philosophers from unconscious biases in morality. And these findings in
general suggest there must be something more to being a moral expert than having
the characteristics of a moral philosopher.

2.2 Defining moral expertise in judgment
Much of this confusion disappears if we distinguish between different types of moral
expertise. Driver helpfully identifies three distinct types. First is expertise in moral
judgment, which involves the ability to arrive at true moral judgments better than
others. Second is expertise in moral practice, which involves the ability to act
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morally well more than others. Third is expertise in moral analysis, which involves
superior insight into the nature of morality in some respect (Driver 2013, 283). Jones
& Schroeter identify a fourth type, which is expertise in giving and evaluating moral
reasons (or, ‘expertise in moral reasoning’). This involves the ability to articulate
morally relevant features of situations (Jones & Schroeter 2018, 460).
Moral philosophers are good candidates for having expertise in moral
analysis and reasoning. For the purposes of my discussion, though, I’m not
interested in these types of moral expertise. Neither am I interested in expertise in
moral practice, which moral philosophers (unfortunately) do not seem to excel in.
What I’m exclusively interested in is a version of Driver’s expertise in moral
judgment.
Expertise in moral judgment is distinct from the other types of moral
expertise in the following ways. First, it is clearly distinct from expertise in moral
action; one may be good at making correct moral judgments while bad at acting on
them. The distinction between expertise in moral judgment and expertise in moral
analysis and reasoning is trickier. On one hand, expertise in moral judgment is
conceptually distinct from the latter two types of expertise. On the other hand, one
might think that having expertise in moral analysis and reasoning puts one in a good
position to also excel at making correct moral judgments. Perhaps it is the case that
experts in moral analysis and reasoning are highly skilled at ‘[arranging] moral
principles in a hierarchy and so be able to deduce what ought to be done in any
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given situation simply by applying the rules’ (Jones & Schroeter 2012; 2018). But if
Schwitzgebel & Cushman are correct that ethicists are equally subject to framing and
order effects in moral problem-solving, the link between having expertise in moral
analysis and reasoning and having expertise in moral judgments is not so tight after
all.
Schwitzgebel & Cushman’s findings are intriguing, but it would be unwise to
rely too much on the scope of their preliminary studies to conclude that moral
philosophers aren’t especially well-placed to have expertise in moral judgment. But I
will argue that there’s another reason to think this is true. In short, an important
component of moral expertise in judgment is the ability to make judgments about
contingent moral truths in complicated situations. The methodology of moral
philosophers is not a very good means towards cultivating this ability to its fullest
extent. I will bracket this issue for now, and fully address it in Section 4.
So, as I’ve noted and as I’ll show, expertise in moral analysis and reasoning
doesn’t put one in an especially good position to acquire expertise in moral
judgment. On the flip side, one may also have expertise in moral judgment without
having expertise in moral analysis or reasoning. Familiarity with moral theory
doesn’t seem necessary for moral knowledge. Someone could know, or justifiably
believe, that lying is morally wrong without inferring this from some higher-order
principle (Tropman 2018, 474). And returning to the matter of contingency,
philosophers have also noted that a significant amount of our moral knowledge is of
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contingent moral truths, which we don’t derive from necessary moral truths of the
type favoured by moral philosophers. Lord notes that it’s implausible to think that
necessary moral truths play a prominent role in the average person’s acquisition of
moral knowledge (Lord 2017, 18). Milona notes that it’s unlikely that we support all
our contingent moral knowledge with necessary moral truths (Milona 2017, 16-18).
I’ve outlined the ways in which expertise in moral judgment are different
from expertise in moral action, analysis, and reasoning. For ease of discussion, I’ll
henceforth refer to expertise in moral judgment as ‘moral expertise’, and experts in
moral judgment as ‘moral experts’. Readers can assume that the following
discussion of ‘moral experts’ and ‘moral expertise’ pertains exclusively to moral
judgment, unless stated otherwise. The task is now to give a definition of both.
Driver, no doubt, had an important qualification in mind when defining the moral
expert in judgment. This is worth noting explicitly: the moral expert’s correct moral
judgments must be made in virtue of her own moral sensitivities. In other words, her
expertise must derive from her own moral skill. We expect this much of experts in
non-moral domains.4 So, for instance, someone who constantly relies on the moral
testimony of others to arrive at correct moral judgments doesn’t count as a moral
expert.
Our definition of moral expertise, then, must stipulate that moral expertise

4

Howell notes that if one’s surgeon comes into the operating theatre with a ‘grin and a
medical textbook’, we wouldn’t think much of him as a surgeon; at best, he’s a practiced
reader with a good pair of hands (Howell 2014, 400).
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must exist in virtue of an agent’s own moral sensitivities. This still isn’t the whole
picture, though. Since what we ultimately desire from experts is knowledge, it is
worth building this explicitly into the definition of moral expertise. With all of this in
mind, we can define moral expertise as the following:

Moral expertise: Moral expertise within moral sub-domain D is an agent’s
competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant
features, within D.

2.3 Defining moral experts
Now that we’ve defined moral expertise, how can we define moral experts? This task
is more complicated than it seems. We cannot simply define a moral expert as
‘someone who has moral expertise’. First, note that moral expertise comes in degrees.
It isn’t a binary, on-off property of moral epistemic agents. One may have no moral
expertise, a little of it, quite a bit of it, or an enormous amount of it. The fact that
someone may have a low but real amount of moral expertise, then, shows that it’s
possible for one to have moral expertise without being a moral expert. There is a
distinction between experts and expertise (Jones 1999, 64), and an agent’s possession
of moral expertise does not entail that they are a moral expert (Jones & Schroeter
2018, 461).
How then should we define moral experts? For now, I’ll have to default to the

17

unsatisfying working definition that a moral expert is ‘someone with a sufficiently high
level of moral expertise’. Unfortunately, this is also complicated by the fact that this
sufficiency constraint can be read in two ways, depending on whether one holds
experts to ‘relative’ or ‘objective’ standards. If standards for being an expert are
relative, then whether or not someone is an expert in some domain depends on how
competent the rest of the population is in that domain, or the competence of
members of some contrast class.5 But if standards for being an expert are instead
objective, then whether or not someone is an expert in some domain depends on
whether they meet some population-independent standard of competence in that
domain.6 I think that both notions of moral experts are useful. So I’ll resist
characterising my account solely in either set of terms. And on either definition of
expertise, we can still surely identify clear cases of moral expertise and naivety at
both extremes of the spectrum. So, my definition of a moral expert will suffice for
our purposes.

5

One way to cash out relative expertise is to say that a moral expert is someone with more
moral expertise than sufficiently high percentage of the general population. But we can also
plausibly say that person (or group of people) A is a moral expert relative to person (or
group of people) B, irrespective of where either of these agents stand in the general
population. For instance, there is a sense in which all normal adults are moral experts
relative to the class of five-year-old children (Driver 2013, 283).
6
If experts are held to an objective standard, then one (but not the only) possibility in is that
moral experts are those whose rates of accurate moral judgment are sufficient to meet some
pre-determined accuracy rate. A problem with this characterisation, though, is that it’s
difficult to stipulate what the precise cut-off point should be for expert status, or if there is
any determinate cut-off point at all. Still, we can surely identify clear cases of moral
expertise and naivety at both extremes of the spectrum. And we can surely say that one
necessary requirement for someone to count as an objective moral expert is that their true
moral judgments must count as knowledge.
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3

The non-intellectualist picture of moral expertise

Relatively recent work on moral expertise by Driver, Jones, Schroeter, and others
paint a combined, plausible picture of moral expertise, which stands in opposition
with the ‘intellectualist’ picture painted by Singer. In this section, I’ll discuss this
‘non-intellectualist’ picture. I’ll begin by introducing three features of the current
non-intellectualist picture (3.1). Next, I’ll propose a new addition to the nonintellectualist picture which has important implications for the rest of the paper. This
is the claim that moral experts must be highly skilled at making contingent moral
judgments (3.2). Last, I’ll note that the current picture lacks a good account of its
most important claim—the claim that moral expertise is typically generated through
experience (3.3).

3.1 Three features of the current non-intellectualist picture
The current non-intellectualist picture has argued for at least three features of moral
expertise. I’ll outline them in turn.
(1) First, moral expertise is typically generated through concrete experience
with the real world. Jones (1999) notes that rich experiences with certain types of
moral problems can contribute to moral expertise. One way to have such richer
experience is through one’s social location. Being a woman, for instance, can
contribute greatly to one’s moral expertise on matters of sexism (65). One can also
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have richer experiences in virtue of choice. For instance, someone who chooses to
engage in political liberation movements is in a good position to gain moral
expertise about social justice in those contexts (65-66). Driver (2006) agrees that
experience matters, and notes that experience of the ‘right sort’ provides a plausible
path towards moral expertise. Driver cites Mill’s argument for the promotion of
higher over lower pleasures to argue that sufficiently ‘broad’ experiences can be
valuable. According to Mill, the only competent judges of whether ‘higher pleasures’
are superior to lower ones are those who have experienced both (627; Mill 1998, 56).
Analogously, we have reason to give greater weight to the view of someone who has
experienced both freedom and repression regarding which is to be morally
promoted (628). In addition to the broadness of experience, Driver notes that we
may also weigh the ‘deepness’ of experience. First personal experience, for instance,
is often privileged. Someone who’s experienced a tragedy is frequently taken to be a
greater authority on that tragedy than someone who hasn’t, since imagination,
empathy, and sympathy only take you so far (628). Although experience is neither
sufficient nor strictly necessary for moral expertise, it’s certainly important, and the
best way of thinking of experience is as providing a plausible mechanism for the
development of moral sensitivity (629). Sreenivasan (2015), as a side note to his
discussion on moral deference, notes that differences in experience may be a causal
factor in moral learning; the ‘wise people who populate legend and folklore are

20

invariably wise old people (46). McGrath (2011c) argues that being ‘acquainted’7 with
some controversial practice often puts one in a better position to evaluate its
morality, and briefly speculates that this puts pressure on us to incorporate
conditions requiring acquaintance into an account of moral expertise. This stands in
direct contrast with Singer’s intellectualist model of moral expertise, under which
one could qualify as a full-fledged moral expert even in the complete absence of any
acquaintance with those practices whose morality one is an expert (28).
(2) Second, moral expertise typically exists in local moral sub-domains,8 and
does not exist globally over morality in general. Jones (1999) was the first to note the
distinction between global and local claims to moral expertise, and argue that moral
expertise is typically unevenly distributed with respect to certain domains (64-67).
Driver (2006) also notes that it seems ‘far more likely’ that moral experts possess

7

For McGrath, one may be ‘acquainted’ with some real life event by witnessing it first hand,
or seeing the event depicted in media like videos or photographs. In her sense of
acquaintance, ‘one can be acquainted with a practice in virtue of viewing veridical pictures
or videos of genuine instances of that practice. What distinguishes acquaintance with a
practice from descriptive knowledge of that practice is that the former essentially requires a
relation to a particular, concrete instance of the practice (even if that relationship is mediated
in some way), while the latter does not’ (4, fn. 6). Like McGrath, I’m happy to count
acquaintance with veridical pictures or videos as an important type of experience with the
real world. Lord also invokes the term ‘acquaintance’ while discussing the role of
experience, although he focuses on acquaintance with morally relevant properties rather
than events, and thinks that one can also be acquainted with the moral features of of nonveridical imaginative experiences (Lord 2017, 18-19).
8
Non-intellectualists haven’t explicitly provided any definition of what a ‘moral subdomain’ is. The notion, while intuitive, is quite hard to pin down. I propose that moral facts
can belong in the same moral sub-domain in virtue of at least three plausible reasons: (1)
Agents being likely to encounter them in the same contexts, (2) invoking the same thick
ethical concepts, and (3) being about the same purely descriptive phenomena. Notice that
these three intuitive ways of identifying moral sub-domains support the idea that the way
they’re individuated has a lot to do with how we experience the world.
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‘local expertise rather than global expertise’ (625). Moral experts, far from always
being geniuses who can discern rightness and wrongness in any type of situation,
typically demonstrate expertise in specific moral sub-domains without necessarily
demonstrating expertise in others. For instance, one may be an expert in detecting
violations of free speech norms while failing to be an expert on sexism (625). This
follows quite naturally from the fact that moral expertise is typically generated
through experience, since different agents lead different lives and have varying
experiences with the world. Jones & Schroeter (2012) note that since moral subdomains ‘present their own characteristic patterns in the combinations of moral
considerations that tend to occur within them, … [and] given that the world of value
is complex and the capacities needed to navigate it are many and various, it is much
more realistic to expect that such human moral expertise as it exists would take
patchwork form rather than [an] idealised form’ (223).
(3) Third, Jones & Schroeter (2012) have argued that moral experts do not
always produce action guiding moral judgments. A good picture of moral expertise
‘abandons the thought that expertise is shown only or primarily in all-in judgments
about rightness and instead looks for more piece-meal context dependent expertise
with particular thick moral concepts, such as honest and respectful, rather than with
thin ethical concepts such as right or ought (219). All-in moral judgments ‘form just a
fraction of our moral judgments’, and it is important for a good model of moral
expertise to accommodate this (222). Once again, this follows naturally from the fact
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that moral expertise is typically generated through experience. Since agents have
different experiences, moral expertise typically exists in local sub-domains; this in
turn means that moral expertise within some sub-domain does not guarantee
expertise in making final action-guiding moral judgments about issues that cut
across multiple sub-domains. What it does guarantee is expertise with the specific
values present in local sub-domains.

3.2 The importance of contingent moral knowledge for moral experts
Now, I’ll argue for a fourth feature that should be added to the non-intellectualist
model, which has big implications for the rest of this paper. I argue that moral
experts must be skilled at making contingent moral judgments about the actual
world, and that their skill at making necessary moral judgments is much less
important.
Necessary moral truths are moral propositions which are true in all
metaphysically possible worlds, and necessary moral propositions are those which
purport to be true across all metaphysically possible worlds. Candidates for
necessary moral truths include ‘murder is wrong’ (Lord 2017, 18) and ‘we ought to
act so as to maximise (net) pleasure’ (Milona MS, 4). If these claims turned out to be
false, they would merely be necessary moral propositions.
Contingent moral truths, which I’ve briefly introduced in Section 1.2, are moral
truths which are not true across all metaphysically possible worlds, and contingent
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moral propositions are those which do not purport to be true across all
metaphysically possible worlds. Schroeder gives an example of a contingent moral
truth: ‘It would be wrong for me not to show up for the tenth annual Wisconsin
Metaethics Workshop’. This is contingent ‘because I promised to attend, and hence
could easily have been false, if only I had been selective about the commitments that
I took on’ (Schroeder 2014, 129). The truth of Schroeder’s claim, of course, is
contingent on more factors than his promise. For instance, a sudden family
emergency might have dissolved his promissory obligation to attend the workshop.
Or, the workshop could have been cancelled altogether. So the truth of contingent
moral propositions hinges on multiple features of what the actual world is like, and
the multiple values it presents.9 It’s also important to note, as I have in Section 1.2,
that we frequently gain knowledge of contingent moral truths without deriving them
from necessary moral truths. Again, it’s unlikely that we support all our contingent
moral knowledge with necessary moral truths (Milona 2017, 16-18). And familiarity
with moral theory and higher-order necessary principles doesn’t seem necessary for
moral knowledge (Tropman 2018, 474).
Any good model of moral experts, I argue, should prioritise their ability to
gain contingent moral knowledge over necessary moral knowledge. In other words,
9

Another example is given by Milona, of the following contingent moral proposition: ‘Bert
was right to help the elderly man cross the street’. This proposition is contingent because, for
instance, ‘the elderly man could have been planning to poison his neighbour’s friendly but
noisy dog, in which case it wouldn’t have been right for Bert to help (Milona 2017, 4). This
proposition would be a contingent moral truth if the world exists in such a way that Bert is
indeed right to help the elderly man (which depends on many more factors than whether
the elderly man had plans to poison the dog).
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moral experts should be good at gaining moral knowledge that is tethered to our
everyday actual lives, and it is less important that they are good at acquiring
necessary moral truths. I expect that many moral philosophers will resist this idea,
since it stands in direct contrast with the field’s predominant theoretical priorities.
Traditionally, necessary moral truths are what ethicists quest after (Milona MS, 4).
Investigating necessary moral truths has monopolised most theoretical discussions
in the field, and the pursuit of contingent ethical truths is unpopular amongst moral
philosophers (Lord 2017, 18).
But as Lord notes, how we think of moral epistemology shouldn’t be shaped
by moral philosophers’ theoretical priorities (Lord 2017, 18). So, we shouldn’t allow
these priorities to shape what we want from moral expertise. First, as a matter of fact
which I’ve noted in Section 1.2, a significant amount of moral knowledge (if not most
of it) is of contingent moral truths. In addition to Lord (2017) and Milona (2017, MS),
Schroeder (2014) has also noted that many of our important moral truths are
contingent, rather than necessary (129). Second, this fact is not some undesirable
symptom of our incapacity to easily acquire the necessary moral truths we’re ‘really
looking for’. On the contrary, it accurately represents most of our moral interests in
the world. To emphasise part of the point that Schroeder makes: many of our
important moral truths are contingent, rather than necessary. Outside the field of
moral philosophy, our everyday moral interests are about the moral status of things
given the way things are. This partly explains why many students get frustrated
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when their ethics professors present them with highly simplified, futuristic,
hypothetical thought experiments. In some sense, their frustration is not misplaced.
What we frequently want is to become good at assessing the complicated moral
dilemmas, with numerous competing values, that are presented to us in the actual
world. So, a good and useful account of moral experts must accommodate our
everyday interests by requiring them to be skilled in making correct contingent
moral judgments about the actual world, and the complicated moral cases it
presents. If someone is not good at acquiring such contingent moral knowledge, then
we cannot properly characterise her as a moral expert.
Non-intellectualists about moral expertise should be happy with this claim.
First, the claim that moral experts should be good at acquiring contingent moral
truths about the actual world rests well with the notion that our notion of moral
expertise, and what we demand from moral experts, should be grounded in the real
world and all its complexities. Another reason lies within their claim that moral
experts will, and should, frequently produce expert moral judgments that aren’t
action-guiding, and instead take the form of whether thick ethical concepts apply.
For instance, it is important that a moral expert in the sub-domain of racism should
be able to identify something as racist. And whether or not thick ethical concepts like
racist apply depends on contingent facts about the actual world. So, all such
judgments are contingent moral judgments. If non-intellectualists wish to keep this
feature of their model of moral expertise, they should be happy with the claim that a

26

moral expert should be skilled at making contingent moral judgments about the
world. Last, as I will lay out in Section 3, the experience that non-intellectualists
prioritise is a very good means of acquiring contingent moral truths about the world,
and developing expertise in acquiring contingent moral knowledge.

3.3 The need for non-intellectualists to justify the role of experience
The non-intellectualist model of moral expertise is appealing, and the discussion
above gestures us in the right direction. But what’s still lacking is a detailed
argument and moral epistemic story narrating precisely how particular experiences
with the world can generate moral expertise—particularly moral expertise in
acquiring contingent moral knowledge. When we experience the world, precisely
what is it that happens that allows us to become better at knowing contingent moral
facts in virtue of our own moral sensitivities? If we were to trace the development of
someone who started as a moral novice and subsequently acquired moral expertise
through her experience, how would that story be told? Precisely how do an agent’s
moral beliefs, and her capacity to acquire moral knowledge, change as she
encounters the world? The current literature lacks such a detailed account.
Thankfully, some philosophers have given useful accounts of how experience
helps us to acquire moral knowledge. Although these accounts stop short at
addressing the issue of moral expertise, they do pave the way for the type of account
I’m looking for. McGrath (2011a) argues that experience can play at least four crucial
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roles in our acquisition of moral knowledge. Experience can contribute to moral
knowledge by playing an enabling role, a triggering role, a sensitising role, and by
supplying evidence for non-moral propositions that subsequently inform one’s
moral thinking. Lord (2017) argues that experience both puts one in an especially
good position to gain moral knowledge about those particular experiences, and also
plays an important role in the development of general moral sensitivities. These
arguments about moral knowledge are instructive, and I will build on parts of their
accounts in the section to come.

4

The role of experience in producing moral experts

Now, I’ll tell the story that’s missing in the literature on moral expertise. Using a
sentimentalist perceptualist framework, I’ll argue that extensive experience puts one
in a good position to develop moral expertise, and eventually become a moral
expert. This is because experience is good at causally prompting moral perceptions
in the form of affective experiences, causally prompting contingent moral judgments
about the actual world, and causally prompting moral adjustment over time. I
propose that this can give rise to a form of moral perceptual learning, and this is how
experience gives rise to moral expertise. What arises from repeated experiences with
certain types of phenomena is an increased level of moral sensitivity with respect to
those phenomena. This gives rise to an increased level of moral expertise in the
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relevant moral sub-domains, and puts them in a good position to become a moral
expert.

4.1 Preliminary notes about experience, sentimentalist perceptualism,
and contingencies
First, here are some important notes about the picture I’ll paint.
(1) When I say that experience puts one in a good position to develop moral
expertise and become a moral expert, I mean that experience provides a path
towards expertise that the typical agent can take advantage of under relatively
agreeable circumstances. The possibility of becoming a moral expert depends on
factors other than experience, such as one’s affective constitution, reflective
capacities, moral environment, and so on. Although I lack the space to fully address
all the factors that make up these ‘relatively agreeable circumstances’, and the extent
to which each of these factors matter, the reader should note that I’m not claiming
that merely having experience is sufficient to generate moral expertise. What I mean
is that experience puts agents who, for instance, are decently responsive to moral
features and are not brainwashed by immoral ideologies in good positions to
develop moral expertise.
(2) I’m also not making the strong claim that experience is strictly necessary
for moral expertise and becoming a moral expert. Like Driver, I want to allow for the
theoretical possibility that one may have moral expertise despite having

29

impoverished levels of experience; it is theoretically possible that there are five-yearold moral savants (Driver 2013, 283). What I will be arguing in Section 4, however, is
that for the vast majority of agents in the real world, experience will turn out to be
necessary after all. So if such moral savants exist at all, they are few and far between.
(3) Given the definition of moral expertise, this will be an account of just how
experience puts one in a good position to acquire the moral sensitivities necessary
for expertise. Here is the working definition of ‘moral sensitivities’ I will assume. An
agent has expert moral sensitivities if and only if she responds to moral cases in
some way that allows her to produce reliably correct moral judgments on her own.
My definition of moral sensitivities and hence moral expertise, then, invokes
reliabilism. However, I am open to the possibility that moral expertise is better
captured in other terms, like that of virtue epistemology. The reader should not see
me as being necessarily committed to reliabilism.
(4) My account will invoke, but not defend for reasons of space, the view of
moral perceptualism. According to perceptualist accounts of moral epistemology, at
least some moral properties can be part of the contents of perceptual experience. In
other words, we can have ‘evaluative experiences’—or ‘evaluative intuitions’—
which are a subset of perceptual experiences. Moreover, on the view of moral
perceptualism I invoke, these evaluative experiences justify moral beliefs for the
same reasons that ordinary perceptual experiences justify ordinary perceptual
beliefs. Just as the contents of ordinary perceptual experiences can provide prima
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facie justification for ordinary perceptual beliefs, moral properties present in the
contents of evaluative experiences can provide prima facie justification for moral
beliefs. My visual experience of seeing a red mug, for instance, provides prima facie
basic justification for believing there’s a red mug in front of me. In the same way,
experiencing the moral intuition that one ought to save a drowning child from a
shallow pond provides prima facie basic justification for believing that one indeed
ought to do so.
(5) The variety of moral perceptualism I’ll be invoking, but again not
defending, is sentimentalist perceptualism.10 On this view, our moral perceptions come
in the form of affective experiences, such as emotions and desires. It is affective
experiences which form the foundations of our moral epistemology, and give us
prima facie basic justification for our moral beliefs.
This stands in contrast with ‘intellectualist perceptualism’, which instead
asserts that our moral perceptions come in the form of intellectual evaluative
experiences (like the intellectual ‘seemings’ we get when we grasp mathematical
truths). Sentimentalist perceptualism also stands in contrast with the moral
perceptualist view of what’s been called ‘perceptual intuitionism’. On this view,
moral properties can be part of the contents of experience in one of the traditional
sense modalities like vision and hearing, as opposed to being part of the contents of
10

This type of view has been given various other names in the literature. For instance, it has
been called ‘response intuitionism’ (Tropman 2018) and ‘affectual intuitionism’ (Roeser, 2011;
Werner 2016). It has been defended by Döring (2007), Roeser (2011), and Milona (2016),
discussed and not rejected by Cowan (2013; 2015) and Werner (2016), and invoked by Lord
(2017) and Milona (2017; MS).
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emotional experience (Werner 2016, 297).11
Just how do affective experiences allow us to perceive moral properties?
Sentimentalist perceptualists commonly note that many of our affective experiences
involve experiences of value. For instance, anger involves a presentation of having
been wronged, and desire involves a presentation of its object as good (Milona 2017,
4, 13). Another example from Döring is the indignation one might feel at the harsh
punishment of a toddler who has accidentally dropped his ice cream. It seems to you
that the punishment is unjust, and your affective state of indignation puts forth its
content as correct. This is analogous to the content of a sense perception (Döring
2007, 377).
(6) I will follow sentimentalist perceptualists like Milona (2016; 2017; MS) and
Lord (2017) in assuming that our affective experiences typically present contingent
moral propositions as being true, as opposed to necessary moral propositions. And
Lord notes, it is unpopular to think that we can learn about necessary moral truths
via experience (Lord 2017, 18).12 Milona argues that well-functioning affective
experiences do not typically respond to contents which guarantee the presence of a
corresponding value, and so the propositions that they help us know will typically
be contingent, and not necessary (Milona MS, 17; 2017, 13-23). Zagzebski argues that

11

See e.g. McBrayer (2010a; 2010b) for a defense of perceptual intuitionism. Werner (2016)
notes that one reading of Audi (2013) can be interpreted as defending this view.
12
More properly, Lord thinks that it is unpopular to think that we can learn about these
truths via ‘acquaintance’. On Lord’s view, one can be acquainted with normative properties
via both experience with the real world, as well as imaginative experiences. I agree with
Lord, and discuss the role and limitations of imaginative experiences in Section 4.
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an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its object as falling under a thick
affective concept (Zagzebski 2003). If this is true, then moral perception via emotions
will always be sensitive to contingent descriptive factors of the situation, and will
hence present contingent moral propositions to be true. On these views, the
indignation one feels at the toddler’s harsh punishment makes it seem to you that
that particular instance of a harsh punishment was unjust, and not, for instance, that
all harsh punishments are always unjust. And as Milona notes, this doesn’t mean
that we can ‘stumble’ into knowledge of necessary moral truths, or use our
contingent moral judgments to justify necessary moral judgments (Milona 2017, 6,
20-23).
(7) Importantly, nothing about sentimentalist perceptualism implies that
affective experiences are the only means through which we obtain moral knowledge.
This is obviously implausible, one reason being that affective experiences, just like
ordinary perceptual experiences, often mislead. Döring notes that one need not
endorse the contents of one’s moral perception, just as one need not endorse the
contents of one’s ordinary sense perceptions although they have the appearance of
truth (Döring 2007, 378-379). The beliefs we form from moral perceptions are subject
to adjustment, and indeed, refining one’s beliefs by learning how to use one’s moral
perceptions is the gateway to moral expertise and becoming a moral expert. This will
be made clear in the discussion to come.
With these qualifications out of the way, I’ll now proceed to show how
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experience with the real world puts one in a good position to develop moral
expertise.

4.2 Experience

causes

moral

perceptions

and

immediate

moral

judgments
First and foremost, experience plays the role of causally triggering affective
responses to normative properties. Taking an example from Lord, someone who
witnesses a hanging for the first time will probably experience a host of affective
reactions to the scene in front of him, such as disgust, repulsion, and sadness (Lord
2017, 10). Such affective experiences come prior to moral judgments, and agents may
have them without coming to any moral judgments at all.13 For one, as previously
noted, one need not endorse one’s immediate moral perceptions as being true.
Moreover, an agent may not recognise the moral implications of her affective
experience. For instance, in a series of real-life interviews of subjects who have
witnessed prisoners being executed via lethal injection, many interviewees reported
a host of negative affective reactions to the experience of watching someone being
killed. None, however, reported making the explicit judgment that the executions
they witnessed were morally wrong.14 I take it that it is extremely common for

13

Here, I’m assuming the view that affective responses that form the bases of our beliefs are
prior to those moral beliefs (see, e.g. Audi 2013). But there are other views which claim that
affective responses aren’t prior to moral beliefs, but instead combine with them to form a
single unitary state. Roser (2011), for instance, argues that moral emotions are candidates for
genuine moral knowledge in this way.
14
From an interview by the New York Times, ‘Bearing Witness to Executions: Last Breaths
and Lasting Impressions.’ (April 23, 2017)
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agents to have affective moral perceptions without yet endorsing any moral
judgments that these perceptions might justify, or even recognising that they are
engaging in anything like moral perception at all. Experience, then, is a good way to
trigger moral perceptions in the form of affective reactions, so long as moral agents
are decently affectively responsive to at least some moral features of the world.
After experience prompts an agent to have an affective experience that
constitutes a moral perception, her next moral epistemic step is to use that
perception to form a moral judgment (or set of moral judgments). One way for her to
do this is to take her affective experiences at face value, and immediately endorse the
contents of her moral perceptions. For such an agent, experience causally contributes
to the formation of moral judgments quite directly through her moral perception.
Lord notes in his hanging example that the host of negative affective reactions one
may have while witnessing a hanging can allow one to learn and judge that the
particular hanging is wrong, and that hanging in general is wrong (Lord 2017, 10).
Döring notes that an emotion can lead an agent to judge a content involving an
evaluative notion, that he would not otherwise in fact have judged (Döring 2007,
390). One simple way to read both Lord and Döring’s examples is that such agents
are taking their affective experiences at face value. McGrath notes that experience
plays a psychological role in prompting one to make moral judgments one would
otherwise not have made (2011b, 7). She remains silent on just how one may come to
form this judgment; on my account, this might happen when an agent takes her
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affective moral perceptions at face value.15 Experience is a good way to trigger these
sorts of moral judgments, since experience is an especially good way to trigger the
moral perceptions that form the direct basis for these judgments. Importantly, note
that the moral judgments that moral perceptions directly provoke will typically be
contingent judgments about the the particular situations that provoked those
perceptions.

4.3 Experience causally prompts moral adjustment
An agent, of course, need not take her moral perceptions at face value. Although
most of us do this from time to time, I take it that only unwise or morally naïve
agents are in the habit of always taking their affect at moral face value. So, what I’ve
said so far is a long way from establishing the link between experience and moral
expertise. Here, I’ll take us one step further by arguing that experience puts one in a
good position to undergo what I call moral adjustment.
Instead of taking their moral perceptions at face value, agents may instead
compare their occurent perceptions against prior moral beliefs, or other conflicting
occurent moral perceptions. Audi notes that following an affective moral intuition,
we may choose to withhold judgment and engage in ‘reflection’, which can confirm
or disconfirm our initial intuition, providing a path to an eventual moral judgment
15

I’ve simplified things somewhat in my citations of Lord, Döring, and McGrath. The most
straightforward way to read them (or at least the sections I’ve referenced) is to see them as
addressing how agents can unreflectively make moral judgments on the spot. But their
accounts can certainly accommodate intermediary reflection between having a moral
perception and making a moral judgment.
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(Audi 2013, 165). Unlike Audi, I’ll resist using the word ‘reflection’ to exhaustively
characterise this type of process by which we an arrive at more sophisticated moral
judgments. This is because it risks over-intellectualising the possible ways in which
one might refine one’s moral beliefs. I wish to allow for the plausible possibility that
this can happen without too much explicit deliberation on the agent’s part.
Consequently, I’ll refer to this process as moral adjustment. The process of moral
adjustment includes, but isn’t exhausted by, rigorous and conscious moral reflection.
For the sake of illustration, consider an agent, Kelly, who has so far only ever
taken her moral perceptions at face value. Due to her particular experiences and
perceptions, the moral judgments she’s formed and the moral perceptions she’s had
have never come into conflict. Although Kelly seems fortunate in some respect, the
consistency of her moral perceptions and judgments doesn’t guarantee their truth.
We think she would do well with some extra adjustment to arrive at more
sophisticated moral judgments. How might experience help Kelly do this?
First, note how unrealistic an agent like Kelly seems. Our experience of the
world is complicated, and few of us have never had reason to question our prior
moral beliefs, or immediate moral intuitions. The more we experience the world, the
more we encounter complex situations involving multiple values, where either our
moral perceptions conflict with our prior moral judgments, or our occurent moral
perceptions conflict with each other. In other words, experience tends to present us
with complex moral dilemmas. The need to resolve this uncertainty is often what
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prompts us to engage in further moral adjustment.
Let’s return to naïve Kelly. Until today, she has only encountered cases of
stealing which are straightforwardly morally wrong. Once, she had her purse
snatched away by a stranger on the street. When this happened, Kelly took her
indignation and anger to form and justify a belief that she had been wronged by the
thief when he stole her purse. Some time after, she witnessed a well-dressed teenager
slip a candy bar into his pocket at a small family-owned store. Again feeling
indignant, Kelly took this emotion justify a belief that this instance of stealing was
wrong. Moreover, she may have taken both of these experiences as justification for
the necessary moral proposition that ‘stealing is always wrong’.
Today, however, Kelly witnesses a man in tattered clothes being arrested at a
grocery store for stealing infant formula. As he’s being dragged away, the man
protests loudly that he had no choice but to commit the crime. As a single father
who’s just been let go from his job, he’s had no money to feed his baby. Kelly finds
the man’s testimony compelling. Far from experiencing indignation at the fact that
infant formula has been stolen, Kelly now feels sad at the man’s predicament, and
outrage that he is being arrested for attempting to feed his child. She believes this is
something he is morally compelled to do, and that others are morally compelled to
allow him to do so. Kelly comes to the contingent moral judgment that this instance
of stealing was morally permissible, if not morally required. (She will also plausibly
realise that this conflicts with her prior necessary moral judgment that ‘stealing is
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always wrong’, and updates her belief in light of this, to form new necessary moral
judgments like ‘stealing is sometimes permissible’, and ‘it is morally permissible to
steal infant formula if a child’s life is at stake’.)
In the case above, experience has prompted Kelly to arrive at more nuanced
contingent (and necessary) moral judgments about the permissibility and wrongness
of stealing in the face of competing value. Experience, however, might also prompt
Kelly to refine the scope of cases she takes to count as stealing at all. Assuming that
Kelly takes ‘stealing’ to be a thick ethical concept, experience may prompt her to
refine the scope of cases she’s willing to apply this concept to. Imagine that Kelly
now sees on the news that someone has been caught taking valuable artefacts from
her favourite British museum in the middle of the night. Kelly feels indignation at
the man’s actions, and pleasure at his being caught; she consequently judges that
justice has been done to someone who has done something wrong by stealing
valuable property. However, the news anchor proceeds to note that this man is an
activist, who took the artefacts with the intention with returning them to Indonesia.
These artefacts were taken from an Indonesian family by Dutch colonisers in the
1820s, without payment or consent, and eventually sold for great profit to the British
museum. Moreover, it turns out that the activist is a descendant of the original
family from whom the artefact was stolen. Kelly, who happens to have strong
feelings about colonialism, now feels outraged that the activist is being punished for
taking back something which was stolen from his ancestors. One thing she might do
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is to use her affect to conclude that this is a morally permissible case of stealing.
However, another alternative—which Kelly ends up taking—is to conclude that
what he did was not stealing, since the artefacts in question had originally been
stolen from his ancestors, and what he did was simply to take back what was
rightfully his in virtue of his heritage. Experiencing this complicated moral case,
then, has prompted Kelly to refine the scope of what she’s willing to apply the thick
ethical concept of ‘stealing’ to. Moreover, it has plausibly prompted her to refine
how’s she’s willing to apply thick ethical concepts related to stealing, such as
‘property’, and prompted contingent moral judgments about the property rights of
the various parties involved in the case.
The cases above demonstrate that experience can cause one to have moral
perceptions that conflict with prior moral beliefs, and hence easily prompt moral
adjustment to produce more sophisticated moral judgments. But note that it’s also
possible for moral adjustment to be prompted by experiences that cause one to have
conflicting occurent moral perceptions about the same case. Indeed, this does seem
like part of what’s happening to Kelly in the museum case above. Upon hearing the
news, Kelly has a host of conflicting affective experiences in a matter of seconds:
initial indignation at the thief, pleasure at his being caught, subsequent indignation
at the actions of the Dutch colonisers, admiration for the activist, and so on. Not only
does she experience psychological tension between some of her moral perceptions
and her formerly-held beliefs about stealing, she also experiences psychological
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conflict between her moral perceptions in the moment.
To sum up, what the discussion above shows is that experience puts agents in
a good position to engage in moral adjustment in order to arrive at more
sophisticated contingent moral judgments (as well as to obtain some amount of
justification for certain necessary moral judgments). This is because experience tends
to present us with complex cases which produce moral uncertainty, which is a good
means of prompting moral adjustment.

4.4 Experience giving rise to moral perceptual learning
Let’s assume that everything Kelly’s concluded so far is correct. What has experience
handed her? One thing she’s obviously gained is new moral knowledge. She now
knows that ‘stealing can sometimes be permissible’, and ‘what the activist did wasn’t
an instance of stealing’. But more importantly for our purposes, Kelly’s been put in a
good position to gain moral expertise, and to eventually become a moral expert with
more experience. Experience has put her in a good position to improve her ability to
acquire moral knowledge in virtue of her own sensitivities. Moreover, she’s in a
good position to acquire contingent moral knowledge, and is thus in a good position
to become as the type of moral expert we want.
I propose that Kelly is in a good position to have undergone, or to undergo
with repeated experience, the moral analogue of what philosophers have called
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perceptual learning.16 Perceptual learning refers to ‘long-lasting changes in perception
that result from practice or experience’, and such cases have often been used to show
that ‘through learning we come to represent new properties in perception, which we
did not represent prior to learning’ (Connolly 2017). Much of the philosophical
discussion on perceptual learning has focused on vision. Siegel, for instance, argues
that spending months cutting down only pine trees in a particular grove of diverse
trees can cause pine trees to look different to us. At the start of this exercise, the pinetree identifier must infer whether or not some tree is a pine tree from various
physical traits of the tree. At the end of this exercise, Siegel argues, they can come to
see pine trees as pine trees, and need not infer this from any more basic physical
characteristics of the trees in question. This is a case of perceptual learning, where
perception comes to represent the property of ‘being a pine tree’, whereas it did not
represent this before. The property of ‘being a pine tree’ becomes part of the content
of one’s perception (Siegel 2006; 2010). Some philosophers have also explicitly
discussed perceptual learning in experts (see e.g. Siewert 1998; Raftopoulos &
Zeimbekis 2015).17 Driver notes how an expert zoologist might see that a particular
swirl in the sand has the property of a ‘being a rattle-snake mark’, while her
daughter might simply see it as being a swirl in the sand. The zoologist might also
16

Thanks to Errol Lord for this suggestion.
Siewert notes that a chessboard in midgame might look differently to a chess player than a
novice, and a car engine might look differently to a mechanic than to someone unfamiliar
with cars (Siewert 1998). Raftopoulos & Zeimbekis consider a scientist who, through
repeated exposure to items in her expert domain, has develop perceptual sensitivity to
certain features. As a result, she might quite literally see the world differently within her
expert domain than a non-expert (Raftopoulos & Zeimbekis 2015, 19).
17
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see that a bird nesting in a particular cactus has the property of ‘being a rare species’,
while her daughter simply sees it as a bird nesting in a cactus. According to Driver,
the zoologist is ‘able to make finer discriminations due to her expert knowledge, and
this in turn really does influence how she sees the world around her’ (Driver 2013,
295).
In all these cases, experience has allowed agents to develop their basic visual
perceptual capacities to a higher level. In other words, experience has allowed these
agents to gain new visual perceptual expertise. Someone who is capable of noninferentially visually representing the property of ‘pineness’ has expertise in
identifying pine trees, and someone who is capable non-inferentially of visually
representing the property of ‘being a rattle-snake mark’ has expertise in identifying
rattle-snake marks. Through repeated exposure to pine trees and rattle-snake marks,
these agents have learned to use their basic visual capacities to non-inferentially
represent artefacts in the contents of their visual experience.
For moral perceptualists, it’s plausible that something analogous to visual (or
other types of) perceptual learning. In other words, we can undergo moral perceptual
learning. If we have moral perceptual capacities, and if the rest of our ordinary
perceptual capacities are subject to perceptual learning, then it’s natural to think that
we can go moral perceptual learning as well. Although Goldie (on one
interpretation) doesn’t subscribe to my type of sentimentalist perceptualism,18 he
18

For the most part, Goldie does not explicitly address what exactly he means when he says
experience and emotion can train us to ‘literally see’ what ought to be done, or what thick
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makes the analogy between ordinary perceptual learning (and skill) and moral
perceptual learning (and skill), quite explicitly:

‘Some people, such as those with certain [non-moral] skills or [moral] virtues,
can, because of their ability, perceive non-inferentially what others, with
normal eyesight, hearing, and so on cannot. Thus two people can be looking
in the same direction, at the same part of the scene, and yet one—the [nonmorally] skilled or [morally] virtuous person—sees things that the other fails
to see. And, once we have room for this, we can add the further point that
[non-morally] skilled and [morally] virtuous people can be trained,
developing an ability that can be learned … This expertise will come in
degrees.’ (Goldie 2007, 349)19

evaluative concepts apply to some case. I find it quite unclear as to precisely what moral
epistemic view he espouses. But he briefly notes that the moral expert’s feeling of ‘shame’ at
looking through someone’s diary is not a justification for the belief that the action would
have been (wrongful) ‘prying’. ‘Rather, both feeling and belief are justified by further
reasons, such as, perhaps, the fact that the action would have been demeaning to both
parties.’ (Goldie 2007, 356). On one reading, this indicates that he thinks affective
experiences cannot provide basic justification for moral beliefs.
19
What Goldie says about the ‘virtuous person’ happens to fit quite nicely with the nonintellectualist picture of moral expertise. According to Goldie, it is implausible that most of
us could ever achieve the ‘unity of the virtues’, or Aristotle’s sense of ‘practical
wisdom’ (phronēsis), where one has a ‘single complex sensitivity’ that allows one to perceive
non-inferentially what the right thing is to do. Agents typically do not have ‘all’ the virtues,
and excel in respect to only a few. So, a morally skilled agent with some virtue (or set of
virtues) will only perceive the demands of that virtue (or that set of virtues) (Goldie 2007,
358-360). This fits quite nicely with the non-intellectualist’s claim that moral expertise
typically exists in local moral sub-domains, and that expert moral judgments are often nonaction-guiding.
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For sentimentalist perceptualists like me, the perceptual capacity which undergoes
learning will be our affective moral perceptual capacity. Through repeated exposure
to various types of moral phenomena, agents can learn to use their basic affective
moral capacities to represent more sophisticated normative features in the very
contents of their affective experiences.
Let’s go back to Kelly, and how she’s been put in a good position to undergo
moral perceptual learning. So far, she has used her basic moral affective capacities
engage in some type of adjustment or inference that what the museum thief did was
not stealing. But if Kelly continues to be repeatedly exposed to cases of apparent
stealing—let’s say she takes on an internship at her local police department—she’s in
a good position to undergo moral perceptual learning by refining her affective
capacities with respect to stealing and property rights, such that she no longer has to
engage in any moral inference or adjustment at all. It looks like Kelly already has the
moral perceptual expertise to perceive clear-cut cases of stealing as stealing. But
repeated exposure plausibly puts her in a good position to accurately perceive more
complex cases as stealing or not stealing, unlike in the museum case where her
conclusion that what the thief did was not stealing was inferential. Repeated
exposure will also plausibly put her in a good position to accurately perceive cases
as a permissible case of stealing, or an instance of wrongful punishment for what is stealing.
She may also become good at perceiving what the compassionate thing to do is when a
thief has been caught.
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In Goldie’s example, one gains the ability to literally perceive what the kind
thing is to do20 through repeated experiences which call for being kind (Goldie 2007).
McGrath gives the example of someone who has participated in many close
friendships; as a result of her experience she’s in a good position to recognise which
disclosures of a friend’s personal information would constitute betrayals, and which
would not (McGrath 2011a, 19). On my account, such an agent may come to be good
at representing such cases as betrayals in her affective experiences. Through repeated
exposure, agents are put in good positions to upgrade their moral perceptual
capacities to accurately make these types of contingent moral judgments. Like the
expert pine tree identifier, they can now become experts at detecting these
contingent moral features by being capable of accurately representing them in her
affective perceptions.
One might make the following objection to my proposal, which rests on a
common objection to sentimentalist perceptualism in general. This is the observation
that moral beliefs don’t always appear to be accompanied by feelings. As Tropman
notes, it seems possible for an agent to believe sincerely that something is morally
bad without experiencing any kind of emotional response (Tropman 2018, 481). If
expert moral judgments are the result of a fine-tuned affective system, how do we
account for such judgments? My first response to this is to note that types of moral

20

More properly, what’s happening here is that the agent perceives ‘what the kind thing is to
do’ by engaging in counterfactual imagination. This perception itself happens in response to
the imaginative experience of the counterfactual scenario provoked by the agent’s moral
dilemma in the concrete world. I will address this in Section 4.3.
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judgments we tend to make ‘dispassionately’ tend to be about necessary moral
propositions, such as ‘one has a moral duty to keep one’s promises’ and ‘one has a
duty to take others’ ends as one’s own’ (Tropman 2018, 481) or ‘one always ought to
maximise (net) pleasure’. But, as I’ve argued, it is much more important for moral
experts to be capable of making accurate contingent moral judgments, which are
much more likely to provoke affect. Zagzebski claims that it is possible to judge that
‘something is pitiful without feeling pity’ judge that ‘something is rude without
feeling offended’ (Zagzebski 2003, 120). Yet, to me at least, it really seems quite
implausible to sincerely make these moral judgments without the accompanying
affect. Zagzebski notes the importance of being able to speak about concepts like
‘rudeness’ and ‘pity’ in a dispassionate way. I agree that it is good for us to be able to
make claims like ‘something is rude if…’ and ‘someone is pitiful if…’. These are the
best candidates for ways in which we may talk about such concepts in a
dispassionate way. Yet they are necessary moral judgments about the definitions of
such concepts; they are not contingent moral judgments about particular instances of
rudeness and pity which are likely to provoke affect.
Moreover, nothing I’ve said blocks off the possibility that processes other than
affective moral perceptual learning contribute to moral expertise as well. There are,
for instance, some very instinctive emotional reactions that are hard for us to unlearn, such as fear and disgust, and moral experts should know when to distrust
them. Milona argues that agents would do well to learn to recognise when their
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evaluative perceptions are misleading, and learn to wisely override them (Milona
2016, 902-905). It is possible, and plausible that learning how to do this in noninferential ways is important for moral expertise, even though it may involve no
change in the contents of one’s affective perceptions.
I lack the space to fully defend the proposal that moral expertise can be
gained via moral perceptual learning, and acknowledge that it is a controversial
proposal. But I think it is an promising possibility that sentimentalist perceptualists
should seriously investigate, and one that all moral perceptualist should investigate
in similar forms, at least if they wish to preserve a tight analogy between moral
epistemology and ordinary perception. If we have moral perceptual faculties which
are analogous to our ordinary perceptual faculties (which moral perceptualists hold),
and if our ordinary perceptual faculties are subject to perceptual learning (which is
plausible), then it is likely that our moral perceptual faculties are subject to
perceptual learning as well.

5

The challenges of imagination

So far, I’ve argued that having extensive experiences with the real world provides a
good way for one to acquire moral expertise and become a moral expert. I still need
to show how experience provides an especially good way for one to acquire moral
expertise. That is, I need to show how it is typically superior to other potential
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means of acquiring moral expertise that do not involve experiencing the real world.
It’s now time to address what some will see as the elephant in the room:
imagination. I take imagination to be the main contender against concrete experience
of the real world as a source of moral expertise. This worry hasn’t been addressed by
non-intellectualists. But now that I’ve invoked sentimentalist perceptualism, it is
especially pressing for me to address the issue. One reason is that the sentimentalist
perceptualists whose views I’ve been relying on have argued that using our
imagination to get contingent moral knowledge is at least as good a means as using
real world experience. What they primarily have in mind are the armchair thought
experiments that are rampant in the methodology of moral philosophy. Here is Lord:

‘The most common way we acquire armchair knowledge of contingent truths
is by thinking about cases. When we do this, we imagine the cases in at least
some detail. The circumstances that we imagine have certain morally relevant
properties. … I think it’s plausible that we often have affective perceptual
experiences of these properties. Thus, I think that ultimately the way we
acquire knowledge of contingent truths via thinking about cases is very
similar to the way we acquire knowledge of contingent truths by
encountering concrete situations in the actual world.’ (Lord 2017, 18-19)

And here is Milona, on the parity of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ moral experiences:
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‘The moral experiences that we have in response to our perceptions and
beliefs about the world—our online moral experiences—do not seem to be
privileged (or at least not always privileged) over the moral experiences that
we have in response to suppositions and imaginings—our offline moral
experiences. … While we rely on actual experiments to figure out the nature of
the empirical world, moral inquiry only seems to require thought experiments.
… Offline affect is incredibly similar to online affect, and the former plausibly
gets its content by virtue of being a simple extension of the latter.’ (Milona
MS, 3, 19)

Other philosophers who aren’t sentimentalist perceptualists have also noted the
power of imagination to provoke morally important affective experiences (e.g. see
Audi 2013;21 Goldie 2007).22 And beyond armchair thought experiments, many
others have also noted that imaginative engagement with narrative fiction can inspire
important moral emotions (see e.g. Nussbaum 1990; Goldie 2007; Johnson 2016; and
21

Audi (2013, 157-161): ‘Intuition can arise from imaginative experience and can indeed
provide evidence for moral judgments in those cases as well as where emotion arises from
actual perception. … We can sometimes be as emotionally sensitive, or as intuitively
insightful, when we imagine a situation calling for a decision as when we actually see one
person relating to another in an actual situation of just that kind. … The exercise of moral
imagination can, through vivid imaging of morally significant events, and through
envisaging diverse possibilities, produce an experience significantly like a moral perception.
… Moral imagination, then, can provide evidence and do so in a way that parallels the way
moral perception provides it.’
22
Goldie (2007, 354-356) gives a discussion of how emotions provoked by counterfactual
thinking can contribute to the development of virtue and moral skill.
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others).23 As Johnson notes:

‘The importance of moral imagination helps account for the large number of
philosophers, literary theorists, and psychologists who argue that moral
cultivation comes more properly from our engagement with historical and
fictional narratives than from treatises of moral philosophy that seek to
articulate either absolute moral principles, catalogues of the virtues, or
ultimate conceptions of the good. It is the narrative depth, complexity, and the
existential validity of literary fictions that situates our moral perception24 and
appraisal in contexts that are psychologically fictional. Narratives can be
morally transformative, insofar as we come to imaginatively inhabit the
world and lives of characters that are both like and unlike ourselves and the
people we encounter in our lives.’ (Johnson 2016, 365)

The threat of imagination becomes even worse when we consider the fact that it
gives us access to seemingly boundless possibilities. Concrete experiences are
limited in a way that imagination is not. Audi notes:

‘By contrast with perception [in the actual world], imagination is creative … it
23

Also see Gardner (1978), Eldridge (1989), Gregory (2009), Friend (2016), and Kind (FC).
It’s doubtful Johnson espouses the type of moral perceptualism invoked by Audi, Lord,
Milona, and me. Here, he likely invokes a more metaphorical sense of ‘moral perception’
which is more akin to something like ‘moral sensitivity’.
24
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is properly limited by (at most) possibilities. Imagination apparently depends
on the world, or at least on experience, for raw material; but it can build
indefinitely many structures from that material … Perception [of the actual
world] is tied to its objects; imagination, even if it requires raw material from
perception, is limitlessly combinatory, often dynamic, and readily responsive
to our desire for even minute alteration. In the moral realm, imagination can
construct morally significant scenarios we have never experienced.’ (Audi
2013, 158-159)

It would be ideal to get a clear grip on precisely what imagination is, or at least what
type of imagination is being invoked by the authors above. Unfortunately, the
literature on imagination is especially murky.25 So, I’ll begin by assuming a rough
functional characterisation of the type of imagination important for moral
development. Here are three plausible necessary conditions. If an agent is engaged
in morally important imagination, then (1) the contents of her mental state have no
immediate input of sensory experiences of the real world, (2) she is not dreaming or
hallucinating, and (3) her mental state provokes or is capable of provoking moral
perceptions in the form of affective responses. This rough characterisation will
suffice for our purposes.
25

There is a great deal of disagreement amongst philosophers and psychologists about what
imagination is, its metaphysical status, what mental states can properly be counted as
imaginative, its phenomenology, and so on. Moreover, Gendler (2016) notes that the general
consensus amongst those in the field is that the term ‘imagination’ is used too broadly to
permit simple taxonomy.
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5.1 The challenges of thought experiments and narrative fiction
Both the ‘narrative fiction’ and ‘thought experiment’ camps I’ve described observe
the importance of imagination in moral epistemology. But interestingly, they
threaten to stand in tension with each other. Traditional thought experiments are
liberal about what sorts of details and particularities may be abstracted away, or how
unrealistic the cases described may be. The whole point of such thought
experiments, it is commonly thought, is to direct one’s attention to morally salient
features by cutting out irrelevant and distracting details. Moreover, philosophers
frequently take advantage of imagination’s boundless possibilities to do so, and
thought experiments often describe wildly implausible scenarios.
Yet for those who stress the importance of fictional narratives in moral
development, fiction is supposed to do quite the opposite. Nussbaum explicitly
notes this opposition by saying that philosophers’ examples almost always lack the
particularity, the emotive appeal, the absorbing plottedness, the variety and
indeterminacy, of good fiction’ (Nussbaum 1990, 46). So, good fiction comes as close
to approximating real life as possible. And the moral power of such fiction comes
from getting us as close to experiencing these realistic narratives as possible. Note,
from the quote above, that Johnson thinks fiction can morally transform us insofar as
we come to ‘imaginatively inhabit the world and lives of characters’. And ‘moral
imagination, both as our capacity to empathically understand and feel with others
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and our ability to imagine how experience would play out under the shaping
influence of various values and choices, is thus dependent on our ability to simulate
experiences … [allowing] us to experience something of the feelings and emotional
responses of other people’ (Johnson 2016, 364, italics by me).
Philosophers like Milona and Lord, of course, don’t disagree that the moral
power of imagination derives from its ability to ‘simulate experiences’. Milona
speaks of ‘sensory imaginings’ (Milona MS, 16) which provoke moral perceptions,
and Lord uses the term ‘imaginative experiences’ (Lord 2017, 18). This suggests that
morally powerful imagination is simply a type of non-veridical experience. Where
these two camps come apart is on how close to concrete experiences these
simulations should be. Those in the thought experiment camp tend to be liberal
about cutting out what they see as irrelevant particularities, and invoking unrealistic
but morally relevant detail, when engaging in moral imagination. In this sense our
imagination is permitted to be far removed from concrete experience. Those in the
fictional narrative camp think that the moral power of imagination derives from its
close approximation to reality, along with all the particularities and indeterminacies
of concrete experience.
It’s also important to note one may think that both thought experiments and
fictional narratives are morally powerful. The ways in which they are powerful are
simply different. Lord, for example, has had undergraduates read both works of
literary fiction and thought experiments in introductory ethics classes (Lord 2016). A
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given work may also simultaneously invoke the powers of both. Good thought
experiments often derive some of their moral power from carefully chosen particular
details. And fictional narratives may also derive some of their moral power by
situating their characters and plots in futuristic settings, or be morally powerful in
spite of their fantastical nature. Science fiction, for instance, can be morally powerful.
There are also fictional works that bluntly highlight moral features in the way that
thought experiments tend to do. Episodes of Star Trek, for instance, are often
(artistically) guilty of presenting crude plots that hammer in moral dilemmas. And
writers have told moral tales that are difficult to properly classify as either a thought
experiment or traditional literature (see e.g. Le Guin 1973).
For my purposes, however, I will stick to the simpler dichotomy that I’ve set
up. Both traditional thought experiments and traditional fiction present challenges to
the privileged role of concrete experience in the development of moral expertise. I
will tackle each of them in turn. What I have to say about each of these challenges
can also be applied to ‘in-between’ cases. First, I’ll tackle the challenges of thought
experiments, considering both the philosopher’s method of deliberately engaging in
lots of time conducting them (5.2), and the method of engaging in thought
experiments under the constraints of ordinary life (5.3). Next, I’ll tackle the
challenges of narrative fiction, first considering the method of engaging in fiction
under the constraints of ordinary life (5.4), and also the method of deliberately
spending lots of time immersing oneself in fiction (5.5).
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5.2 The challenge of thought experiments: round 1
As it turns out, I agree that thought experiments are a useful and powerful tool in
our moral epistemic kit. One cannot deny their force; many college students would
undoubtedly never have gained the basic piece of moral knowledge that ‘one is
morally required to save a drowning child from a pond at relatively little cost to
oneself’ if not for Singer’s famous thought experiment (Singer 1972b). It is also
certainly good that thought experiments allow us to construct hypothetical cases that
one would not encounter otherwise. And I agree with Lord and Milona that
imaginative thought experiments, used properly, can elicit moral perceptions that
are identical in type with those elicited by real life experience.
What I’m skeptical of is the claim that merely engaging in thought
experiments is typically a good means of developing high levels of moral expertise in
specific moral sub-domains, that allow us to make nuanced contingent moral
judgments in relatively complicated solutions. Imagination alone cannot replace the
years of targeted concrete experience that gives rise to this level of expertise. There
are at least two ways of comparing engaging in thought experiments against having
concrete experiences. The first is to evaluate the method of deliberately spending lots
of time doing so (i.e. the moral philosopher’s method). The second is to evaluate
whether for the vast majority of the population who are not professional ethicists,
the moral epistemic value of how much time and effort one can reasonably spend
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engaging in thought experiments can compare to that of the time one spends
effortlessly experiencing the real world. I will begin by evaluating the first.
One question we can ask is what limitations our concrete experience place on
our moral imaginative capacities, no matter how much time we spend engaging in
thought experiments. Audi acknowledges that imagination ‘depends on the world,
or at least on experience, for raw material’ (Audi 2013, 158). On one basic
interpretation, this is just to agree with Descartes’ famous comment that ‘even when
painters try to depict sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they
simply jumble up the limbs of different kinds of real animals, rather than inventing
natures that are entirely new’ (Descartes 1641, 2). In other words, our sensory
experiences with the real world limit what we can depict in non-veridical mental
states like imagining and dreaming.
I grant, however, that the concrete sensory experiences of even the most
hermit-like ethicists are sufficient raw material for constructing decent moral stories.
Moreover, we do not think that blindness or deafness poses any limits on someone’s
ability to be a good moral philosopher. Is the capacity to engage in thought
experiments limited by concrete experience in any other way? One more realistic
possibility is to say that imagination is limited by the higher-level types of events
one has experienced, or otherwise learned about, in the real world. In other words,
the narratives one can concoct, and the moral dilemmas one can pose to oneself, are
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limited by the phenomena one has witnessed or experienced in the real world.26 For
instance, Singer could not have independently imagined a child drowning in a
shallow pond, or having to decide what to do about this, if he was unaware that
people can drown. Philippa Foot could not have independently imagined having to
choose between diverting a trolley to save five lives and kill one person, or letting it
run its course to leave one person alive and let five die, if she was unaware that
trolleys can kill, or unaware that trolleys can be diverted (Foot 1967). But this kind of
limitation can be overcome if one has enough creativity to construct analogous cases
of the same type, if one already has that type of moral case in mind.27 Again, I am
willing to grant that most moral philosophers are creative enough to do so. This is
supported by the fantastical nature that many of their thought experiments have.
At some point, however, an agent’s lack of life experiences can hinder her
imagination in such a way that she is blinded to some types of moral scenarios
altogether. One can imagine that Foot’s concrete experiences might have been
limited to such an extent that she could not have independently conceived of the
moral distinction between killing and letting die. If so, no amount of narrative
creativity could have allowed her to philosophically deploy a thought experiment

26

This ability is somewhat related to what Van Leewuwen calls ‘constructive imagination’,
which ‘generates representations of possible states of the world—ways the world might be—
on the basis of which we might choose actions’, and ‘generates representations of possible
actions to take’ (Van Leewuwen 2016, 295)
27
For instance, Singer could have concocted some non-drowning story demonstrating the
obligation to help at relatively little cost to ourselves. And Foot could have concocted some
non-trolley story demonstrating the difference between killing and letting die, and having to
consider the uneven consequences of some set of choices.
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analogous to the trolley problem. And this brings me to the third and much more
substantive limitation that lacking real life experience imposes on one’s imaginative
ability to engage in thought experiments. What we are able to conceive of as morally
relevant features are influenced by our concrete experiences of the world. We do not
construct thought experiments by churning out all possibilities via brute force,
picking out the most interesting ones. We construct them on the basis of morally
relevant features that we already have in mind.28 Speculative as this may be, perhaps
it is no accident that Judith Jarvis Thomson—a woman—was the first participant in
the previously male-dominated philosophical debate on abortion to even identify
women’s bodies as morally relevant to abortion at all, and demonstrate this glaring
point by constructing her famous violinist thought experiment (Thomson 1971). As
creative as using ‘the possibility of transforming kittens into persons’ to demonstrate
a foetus’s non-right to life,29 such ingenuity cannot make up for the ability to identify
morally relevant features which experience makes obvious, but are nonetheless
obscured from one by lack of it.
It may turn out, of course, that Thomson being a woman had nothing to do
with any of this. But there are other examples. Consider the moral issue of late-term
abortions. As a matter of fact, many of these pregnancies are wanted, but terminated

28

Even if we were to aspire towards churning out stories through brute force, the time and
effort spent doing so would surely then restrict our life-event experiences and even sensory
experiences so severely that the concessions I gave to these two types of limitations would
no longer reasonably hold.
29
This is from a thought experiment by Tooley (1972).
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because of extreme and tragic circumstances. Many late-term abortions, for
instances, are conducted because of late diagnoses of severe fetal abnormalities
which would cause the fetus to be incapable of surviving after birth, or be in severe
pain and suffering. Yet, simplistic moral analyses of the issue (often by men)
demonstrate ignorance of this fact (e.g. see Brooks 2018) that is well-known to those
working in the field. Imagining this morally relevant possibility is theoretically
possible without experience, of course. But in reality it is easy to miss this morally
relevant possibility and imagine that women tend to undergo late-term abortions
‘just because they can’, which is a much less morally complex case to analyse. The
point here is that such analyses are constructed on the basis of morally relevant
features that one already has in mind, and what one is able to conceive of as morally
relevant is limited by one’s concrete experiences. This limitation greatly diminishes
the value of the fact that imagination gives us access to contingent possibilities that
concrete experiences cannot provide. While this is indeed an epistemic edge, being
limited in experience means we will sometimes simply not know what to imagine, or
fail to imagine cases that account for morally relevant features. So engaging in
thought experiments without sufficient concrete experiences is useless.
One can rightfully point out that philosophers have indeed generated
powerful thought experiments. This might indicate that philosophers have levels of
concrete experience that are enough to gain moral knowledge, which goes against
the idea that moral philosophers are not well-positioned to acquire expertise in
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moral judgment. Or, this might indicate that philosophers have succeeded in
generating powerful thought experiments without much concrete experience, which
goes against the claim that concrete experience imposes important limitations on our
ability to construct good thought experiments. But first, we should not assume that
some of the most powerful thought experiments were not aided by moral expertise
gained from the real world; Thomson, for instance, might be an example of this.
Second, we should not assume that the vast amount of philosophical literature, and
the vast number of what seem to be good thought experiments, have covered nearly
enough of the moral truths we want to know, and that we demand of moral experts.
This point—about the wide scope of the moral truths we want to know—
brings me to the last and most crucial way in which concrete experience limits one’s
ability to construct thought experiments, and hence one’s ability to gain high levels
of moral expertise. Recall that in order for an agent to count as a moral expert, she
must be good at making contingent moral judgments in morally complicated
situations. Lord and Milona acknowledge, as do I, that thought experiments allow
one to acquire some amount of contingent moral knowledge. Yet the amount and
sophistication of the contingent moral knowledge one can get via thought
experiments is still limited by one’s concrete experiences. Without concrete
experience, it is impossible to know how the actual world tends to exist and the
combinations of morally relevant features that tend to crop up in specific moral subdomains. Again, as an example, without experience it is easy to miss the contingent
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fact that many late-term abortions are conducted because of severe fetal
abnormalities that are hard to detect in earlier stages, and assume that women tend
to get late-term abortions on a whim. Without being constantly exposed to the
patterns of competing values that tend to contingently present themselves in the real
world, it will be very difficult to cultivate the high level of sensitivity we demand
from moral experts.

5.3 The challenge of thought experiments: round 2
There are other reasons why one might think that thought experiments alone cannot
replace concrete experience.30 I lack the space to consider them all. Instead, I shall
end my discussion of thought experiments by delivering what was promised, and
evaluating thought experiments as an option for the vast majority of the population
who are not professional ethicists. Not everyone is as lucky as moral philosophers to
be paid to do so. Given how much time and effort the average person can reasonably
spend engaging in thought experiments, can the moral epistemic value of doing so
replace the moral epistemic value of the time one spends effortlessly experiencing

30

One tempting route to take is to claim that the affective reactions prompted by the
imagination are somehow ‘inferior’ or less ‘vivid’ compared to the affective reactions
prompted by concrete experience, in a way that makes them morally inferior. To my
knowledge, no sentimentalists perceptualists have addressed this issue. For instance, neither
Milona nor Lord seriously consider the possibility that imagination might produce less
morally effective affective responses than concrete experiences. Lack of empirical evidence,
however, makes it difficult to investigate this issue without tenuous appeals to personal
phenomenology. There is one psychological study which suggests that emotional reactions
to fiction are less intense than emotional responses to nonfiction (Cova et al., in prep).
Without more studies, however, and without more studies specifically on imagination and
moral emotion, it is still difficult to make this point.
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the real world?
The answer is clearly no. Singer takes the average person’s lack of time to
engage in philosophy as a disadvantage: ‘the moral philosopher can, if he wants,
think full-time about moral issues, while most other people have some occupation to
pursue which interferes with such reflection’ (Singer 1972a, 117). Singer takes this to
demonstrate that moral philosophers are much better-positioned than others to be
moral experts. Yet, as we have seen, moral philosophising alone cannot generate the
high levels of moral expertise we are after. Moreover, in ignoring the role of
experience in generating moral expertise. what Singer takes to be the disadvantage
of ‘laypeople’ is actually an advantage. One’s very ‘occupation to pursue which
interferes with reflection’ can provide the chance for agents to develop moral
expertise in sub-domains relevant to those occupations. Singer underestimates the
power of moral conflict and adjustment that ‘the ordinary man’ undergoes in his
daily life, borne by concrete experiences with the real world.
One might point out that daily life combined with thought experiments can be
more powerful than experience alone. And we need not limit our thoughtexperiment-like imaginative experiences to the sort of thought experiments
philosophers entertain. Goldie, for instance, gives an account of how one can
develop virtue by engaging in counterfactual thinking about one’s past and present
real-life experiences, which produces morally important affect (Goldie 2007,
354-356). And we do indeed engage in simple counterfactual thinking about our past
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or prospective actions all the time. This is a crucial part of how we navigate the
moral word. In deciding what we morally ought to do—or whether some action
might be, for instance, cruel—we imagine what might happen if we did this, and what
might happen if we did that instead. And this is certainly crucial for developing
moral expertise.
However, this is no objection to the claim that experience is superior to
‘everyday thought experiments’ in generating moral expertise. This is because the
very possibility of such counterfactual thinking depends on what we are
experiencing in the concrete world. I would not be imagining ‘what might happen if
I did this’ or ‘what might happen if I did that instead’ should I not be having the
experience of having to make that choice. And my claim is not that engaging in such
imagination cannot accelerate the process of developing moral expertise, or that
being a moral expert does not involve such counterfactual thinking, or even that
moral expertise is possible without engaging in such thinking. As I’ve noted,
experience in itself is insufficient for generating moral expertise. The capacity to
engage in such counterfactual thinking may well be necessary for this process. Yet
engaging in this type of morally important imagination is only possible in virtue of
one’s concrete experiences with the world.

5.4 The challenge of fictional narratives: round 1
Moving on from the challenge of thought experiments, I will move on to considering
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fictional narratives as a means of gaining moral expertise, as compared to concrete
experience.
In some ways, this might seem like a harder challenge to meet. Two big
weaknesses of thought experiments are that on their own, they don’t easily equip
agents to handle morally complicated situations, and that they’re bad at allowing
agents to develop moral expertise in making valuable contingent moral judgments
about the real world. But fictional narratives appear to fare much better in this
respect. The moral power of fiction derives from its ability to paint complicated,
compelling, and evocative pictures. Good fictional stories which are situated not too
far from the real world put readers in a good position to gain knowledge of fairly
sophisticated contingent moral truths about the actual world. Fictional stories that
are more fantastical, like science fiction, can still be as morally powerful if their
characters and plots bear relevant similarities to our experience of the real world.
Moreover, the most morally powerful works of fiction allow us to step into the shoes
of others, and simulate the experiences of people who are very different from us.
Fictional works that allow us to successfully ‘try on’ the identities of others have a
moral epistemic advantage over concrete experience, since we are able to simulate
detailed experiences, in compelling ways, that we would otherwise not have had.
Last, those in the ‘narrative fiction’ camp argue that fiction is a good way of
cultivating one’s very moral sensitivity—in other words, one’s moral expertise—as
opposed to merely being a good means to moral knowledge.
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I am happy to grant that all this is true. In fact, I take all these points to count
in my favour. As long as the moral power of fiction derives from allowing us to
simulate experiences in detailed, realistic, and complicated ways, this means that its
moral power is derivative upon the value of concrete experience in cultivating our
moral sensitivities. The moral power of ‘trying on’ the identities of others through
fiction, for instance, derives from the moral power of being those others. So, I argue,
engaging with good fictional narratives will typically be a weaker way to develop
high levels of moral expertise in specific moral sub-domains, as compared to having
concrete experiences with the real world.
As with thought experiments, there are several ways to evaluative the moral
power of fictional narratives. The first is to evaluate the power of reading good
fiction under the constraints of ordinary life. In this case, it is quite clear that doing
so is inferior to concrete experience. Temporarily stepping into some alternative
world, for the period of time it takes to watch a movie or read a novel, is morally
powerful. But surely this cannot replace the value of spending a lifetime actually
being in those scenarios depicted, and actually being those characters described. If the
characters in those movies were brought to life, whatever moral expertise we would
have gained reading about or watching them would almost certainly pale in
comparison to the moral expertise they would have. Watching all the episodes of Star
Trek: The Next Generation, for instance, cannot possibly put me in the same position as
Captain Jean-Luc Picard to become a moral expert at deciding how to interact with
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alien species and cultures who have moral values very different from our own.
Stepping into someone else’s shoes for a short period of time cannot replace actually
being that someone else.

5.5 The challenge of imagination: round 2
We can also evaluate the value of deliberately spending lots of time engaging with
morally powerful fiction. At one extreme is someone who spends her entire life
watching a movie—perhaps shot from a first-person perspective—depicting the
entirety of someone else’s life.31 While this is interesting, it is too unrealistic for us to
usefully consider.
But there is at least one real life case study of extreme engagement with fiction
that is interesting for us to investigate. This is the real life (and very unfortunate)
case of the ‘Angulo brothers’.32 For more than a decade, six brothers and one sister
were locked inside a Manhattan apartment by their father, having no contact with
the outside world. The vast majority of their time was spent watching movies
nonstop, and it is estimated that they watched anywhere from two thousand to five

31

I leave it as an open question of fact as to whether this could replace the moral epistemic
value of actually being that someone else. But note that this case actually blurs the line
between ‘concrete experience’ and ‘imagination’. Should the viewer spend her entire life
literally doing nothing other than watching this movie, she has in some sense inhabited at
least the visual and auditory faculties of the character in the movie. In some sense she has
directly and concretely experienced, in a first-personal way, what it is like (visually and
auditorily) to be that character.
32
Information about the Angulo brothers is from the American documentary film ‘The
Wolfpack’ (Moselle, 2015), and the New York Times article ‘’The Wolfpack’ Tells of One New
York Apartment With Seven Children Locked Inside’ (Barnes 2015).
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thousand films. As Barnes reports, ‘Quentin Tarantino, Christopher Nolan, David
Lynch and Martin Scorsese gave them a window into the world … and injected
badly needed doses of creativity into their lonely, claustrophobic lives’ (Barnes 2015).
Much of their time was spent memorising and transcribing movie lines, creating
costumes and props, and performing their favourite movie scenes for each other.
Eventually, the six brothers escaped, and met Crystal Moselle, who eventually
directed The Wolfpack, a 2015 documentary about their lives, starring the brothers
themselves as the actors. Interestingly, the ‘moral success’ of the Angulo brothers’
obsession with movies seems to be mixed. On one hand, the brothers have described
facing difficulties connecting with people; one stated in the documentary that the
hardest adjustment was ‘having personal connections with other people’, because
‘[their] own reality and our reality was so far removed’. Still, they appear to have
turned out much better than one might expect after being locked up for more than a
decade. For instance, they have described as being ‘sensitive’ and ‘extremely
likable’ (Barnes 2015).
What we can conclude from the case of the Angulo brothers, of course, is
limited. And it is still not descriptive of the majority of cases of those who
deliberately spend lots of time engaging in good fiction. What can we say about
them? I am willing to concede that it’s much more likely that such agents, as
compared to those who engage in extensive thought experiments, might be in a
better position to acquire decent levels of moral expertise in specific sub-domains.
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But this is provided that the moral scope of their fiction is sufficiently narrow and
deep (i.e. they do not hop back and forth between narratives that represent
experiences one might have in many different moral sub-domains), the fiction they
engage with is morally powerful enough, and the way they affectively respond to
fiction comes close to the way they would affectively respond to the real world. It’s
also important to note that fiction, depending on how it’s written, can skew one’s
moral sensitivities in bad ways by not accurately representing certain descriptive
patterns in the real world.33 And these requirements so extremely stringent that it is
quite unrealistic to think that the vast majority of individuals and the fictional works
they choose could meet them. Even for the most avid and morally responsive reader,
who chooses the ‘morally best’ narrative works that exist in the world, it is seriously
unclear that this could ever match up to the value of concrete experience. And
ultimately, most moral epistemic agents do not engage, and are not able to engage,
with fiction this way. So, fictional narratives typically cannot compare to concrete
experience when it comes to developing high levels of moral expertise.

33

Interestingly, Crystal Moselle notes that ‘the downside to all the movies [the Angulo
brothers have watched] is that there are certain formulas to them. Real life is different. In
real life, the girl doesn’t always break your heart. The boys are still struggling to understand
that.’ (Barnes 2015).
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6

Conclusion

To sum things up, I’ve argued for the main claim that experience with the concrete
world puts one in an especially good position to gain expertise in moral judgment.
But really, the scope of this paper has been quite large. In arguing for my main claim
I’ve attempted to give answers to many other questions, and argued against various
positions, in ways that will be quite contentious to many.
I’ve made a number of claims that will rub many moral philosophers up the
wrong way. First, contrary to what they might wish to be true, I’ve argued that they
aren’t especially well-positioned to be experts in moral judgment after all. But moral
philosophers need not be disheartened. The blow is softened by the fact that they
count as good candidates for being experts in moral analysis and reasoning, which is
another important form of moral expertise. Another argument I’ve made is that we
should require moral experts to be good at gaining contingent moral knowledge
about the actual world, and that the role of necessary moral truths ought to be deemphasised on our picture of expertise in moral judgment. Yet moral philosophers
must acknowledge that their own theoretical priorities should not shape what we
demand of some everyday concept that the ‘ordinary person’ has a stake in. And
nothing I’ve said means that there’s no value in moral philosophers questing for
necessary moral truths—this is obviously still a valuable activity in its own right.
Another argument I’ve made is that philosophical thought experiments alone are
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insufficient to generate the high levels of moral expertise in sophisticated contingent
moral judgments that we demand from moral experts. However, this does not mean
that thought experiments have no moral epistemic value—they do. Moreover, I’ve
pointed out that thought experiments and counterfactual thinking, in combination
with concrete experience, can be especially powerful. So nothing that I’ve said means
that thought experiments are useless, or even not very useful.
This chapter also raises many avenues for further philosophical exploration.
My proposal that we can undergo moral perceptual learning is a tentative one. I
think it is an attractive proposal for moral perceptualists in general, but as it stands,
it needs to be further fleshed out. Last, so far I have only been talking about the role
of experience and moral sub-domains in quite general terms. But there is the
possibility that, although experience is important for moral expertise in general, it
will be much more important in certain moral sub-domains than others. Certain
types of experiences with the concrete world might be much harder to replace with
any kind of imagination than others. And this is something I will explore in Chapter
2: in the moral sub-domain of oppression, I will argue, it is so especially difficult to
acquire moral expertise on oppression without having experienced being oppressed.
What this means is that any social progress on the matter must often involve those in
positions of power listening to the moral testimony of the powerless.
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Chapter 2
Moral Expertise on Oppression

1

Introduction

A central tenet of standpoint epistemology is that members of oppressed groups
have a richer perspective on the world than members of privileged groups. In other
words, one’s social privilege negatively correlates with one’s epistemic privilege
(Grasswick 2016). Although standpoint theorists make several more radical claims,
one need not commit to all of them to see how being a member of an oppressed
group can give one superior epistemic access to certain aspects of the world.
Consider the fact that women experience routine sexual harassment from
men. This is something most women know in virtue of their own experiences. Yet,
since sexual harassment tends to occur when women are alone, the phenomenon’s
existence and prevalence is impossible for most non-harassing men to know without
relying on women’s testimony. Moreover, even when men are provided with a full
description of sexual harassment, the phenomenon is dissimilar enough from what
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most men have experienced such that many of them find it difficult to grasp, for
instance, the psychological toll it takes on its victims, the feeling of degradation
experienced by women, and the relationship between instances of harassment taken
in isolation and the routine, long-term sexism which women face in general.
Consequently, many men incorrectly brush off phenomena like catcalling as being
‘no big deal’, and falsely believe that women complain about it for ‘no good reason’.
Many other oppressive phenomena are hidden from socially privileged knowers in
this way, leading to false or absent beliefs about these phenomena.
Much has been said by standpoint epistemologists about how being a
member of an oppressed group gives one access to more knowledge in general. In
this paper, I aim to focus on the distinctively moral epistemic advantages that come
with oppressed group membership. In particular, I’ll argue that oppressed group
members are often in a better position to become a moral expert with respect to the
type of oppression experienced by that group, where moral expertise is defined as
one’s competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant
features. For instance, women are in a better position to become moral experts with
respect to the moral sub-domain of sexism, as opposed to men. They are in a better
position to become competent at forming moral knowledge (on their own) about
whether catcalling is morally wrong, the degree to which it is morally bad, whether
a woman is blameworthy for not confronting her harassers, whether maternal leave
policies are unfair, and so on. This stands in opposition to views held by
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philosophers like Joseph Heath (2015), who hold that no such special epistemic
advantages come with oppressed group membership, since ‘we all live in the same
world’.
Just as this paper aims to add something new to discussions about the
epistemic advantages of oppression, it also aims to add something new to the
separate debate on moral expertise. Existing philosophers in this debate
acknowledge the role of experience in producing moral expertise, and note that the
diversity of human experience can, and often does, produce uneven levels of it
throughout the human population.34 So far, the discussion has been conducted on a
general level. Philosophers have employed useful examples to illustrate these claims,
and some of these have been about various forms of oppression.35 But one can gain
moral expertise with respect to many different issues, and the particular factors
which tend to influence this process vary greatly depending on the moral subdomain in question. There is a great deal to gain from honing in on particular moral
sub-domains. So, these passing examples set the ground for an overdue, in-depth
analysis of moral expertise in the specific moral sub-domain of oppression, which
this paper aims to do.
Here's how I'll proceed. In Section 2, I'll outline the general account of moral
34

See e.g. Driver 2006 & 2013, Jones 1999, Jones & Schroeter 2012 & 2018, McGrath 2011.
Jones (1999), for example, notes that women can ‘come to have richer experiences with certain types
of moral problems’, which can allow them to acquire ‘expertise about the kind of disvalue sexism is,
and the often subtle forms it can take’ 65-66). In the nearby debate on moral understanding, Sliwa
(2017) has noted that first-personal experiences of being a survivor of sexual assault, a victim of
domestic violence, and a disabled person can greatly enable one's capacities for forming moral
knowledge with respect to these issues (549-545).
35
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expertise I'll be working with, discuss how experience works as a means towards
becoming a moral expert, and discuss general factors which can help or harm this
process. In Section 3, I'll apply this picture to the moral sub-domain of oppression,
and argue for the main claim that a member of an oppressed group is often in a
better position to become a moral expert with respect to the type of oppression
experienced by that group. In my conclusion, I'll briefly discuss some of the specific
factors which can prevent oppressed group members from becoming moral experts
on their own oppression.

2

Moral expertise

2.1 What is moral expertise?
In Chapter 1, I’ve focused on the following definitions of moral expertise and
experts:

Moral expertise: Moral expertise within moral sub-domain D is an agent’s
competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant
features, within D.

Moral expert: A moral expert in some moral sub-domain D is an agent whose
moral expertise allows her to reliably form moral knowledge within D.

For instance, one can be a moral expert in the moral sub-domain of friendship, by
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being sufficiently competent at forming moral knowledge with respect to a broad
range of questions about friendship, and by doing so in response to the morally
relevant features which ground those moral truths. This involves knowing whether a
certain act counts as a betrayal, whether one is blameworthy for cutting off a difficult
friend, and so on.
Here are some important things to note. First, the type of moral expert I’m
interested in is the moral epistemic one, even though there are obviously many other
senses in which one can be a ‘moral expert’.36 Second, being competent at forming
moral knowledge isn’t sufficient for one to count as a moral expert; one must be
competent at doing so in response to the morally relevant features of the situation. This
eliminates the possibility that one can be a moral expert solely by being competent at
gaining moral knowledge via testimony.37 Third, a moral expert needn’t be capable
of communicating, or even articulating to herself, the moral reasons which ground
her knowledge. It’s possible for one to reliably form moral knowledge in response to
morally relevant features without having these capabilities.
Fourth, when it comes to moral sub-domains which are individuated by real36

In addition to being competent at forming moral knowledge, one can also be competent at
performing right actions, or engaging in moral reasons. These strands of moral expertise frequently
come apart, however, and having one form doesn’t guarantee having the others. For instance,
excelling in moral reasoning, as many philosophers do, is no guarantee that one will excel at forming
knowledge; the diversity of positions within normative ethics means that the vast majority of moral
philosophers have false moral beliefs with respect to these questions.
37
The morally relevant features which make it the case that it’s impermissible for me to betray my
friend, for instance, may include her potential hurt feelings, her loyalty to me in the past, and that she
is my friend. I may be good at reliably picking out others who can provide me with moral knowledge
about whether I’m permitted to betray her, without responding to any of the morally relevant
features. In such a case, what I’m responding to instead are the epistemic features of the situation
which weigh in favour of trusting someone else’s testimony.
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life phenomena, it isn’t sufficient or even necessary for moral experts to be
competent at forming moral knowledge about necessary moral truths and abstract
moral principles. They must be competent at forming moral knowledge of highly
contingent, everyday moral truths. It’s one thing to know, as many of us do, that
‘betraying a friend is morally bad’, and that ‘one ought to weigh costs and benefits
when deciding whether to lie to a friend’. But it’s quite another thing to know, for
instance, whether to lie to a very depressed friend with extremely low self-esteem
that her bad drawings, which she’s spent days slaving over, are good enough to post
online. Setting side the interests of moral philosophers, the everyday person is
typically fundamentally interested in moral knowledge of the latter type. And quite
plausibly, one need not even have knowledge of the former, more abstract principles
in order to know what to do in complex cases like these.

2.2 Context and combinations of morally relevant features
In previous work, I’ve also argued that extended experience with the real world is
typically crucial, and irreplaceable, for gaining high levels of moral expertise in
many moral sub-domains. But this process relies heavily on the context of an agent’s
experiences, and the combinations of morally relevant features she encounters. So I’ll
first explain these two things and what they have to do with moral expertise. The
main point here is that moral expertise within some moral sub-domain typically
involves being responsive to characteristic combinations of morally relevant
features, when they are present in specific contexts which are distinguished by non-
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moral features.
Let’s begin with context. We often pick up on morally relevant features in
some contexts but are insensitive to those same features in others, where contexts are
distinguished from each other by morally irrelevant (or non-moral) features. For
instance, almost everyone is highly sensitive to the morally relevant feature of
physical pain when it’s instantiated in human beings, but fewer people are sensitive
to it when it’s instantiated in non-human animals. Consequently, even when there
are no morally relevant differences between cases of human and non-human animal
pain, people often draw different conclusions about each type of case. While context
sensitivity clearly produces pernicious biases, it’s also a plausible byproduct of
experience as a method of producing moral expertise. Since the type of experience
that confers moral expertise tends to repeatedly expose us to characteristic
combinations of moral and non-moral features, it’s no surprise that moral experts
will be sensitive to some morally relevant features when they’re accompanied by
certain non-moral features, and insensitive to those same morally relevant features
when those non-moral features are lacking.38
Now, here’s the significance of being responsive to combinations of multiple
morally relevant features. Most of us plausibly count as being moral experts in the
38

For instance, repeatedly experiencing and witnessing racism against the Asian community can
allow one (if all goes epistemically well) to become a moral expert in anti-Asian racism. It’s possible,
however, that the agent’s superior sensitivity towards the morally relevant features of racism (e.g.
degradation, mental suffering, objectification) remains dependent on the presence of non-moral
features that have typically accompanied her experiences (e.g. the target being Asian, rather than
Black), such that she remains incompetent at forming moral knowledge in the sub-domain of antiBlack racism.
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moral sub-domain of ‘relatively simple questions about human physical pain’, in
virtue of our moral sensitivity to physical pain when instantiated in humans. But
moral expertise in more substantive moral sub-domains, such as animal ethics,
requires competence at forming moral knowledge in response to multiple morally
relevant features, which tend to come in certain characteristic combinations. For
example, a moral expert in animal ethics must be morally sensitive towards physical
pain in non-human animals, human interests like staying out of hunger, the value of
human cultural food practices, and so on. And it isn’t enough for one to be sensitive
to all of these in isolation; one must also be sensitive to the combination of all these
features in the right way. Many of us have a decent amount of moral sensitivity to all
these matters alone, but are not very good at weighing the interests of humans and
non-human animals when they conflict.

2.3 Experience as a path towards moral expertise
Now, here’s a simplified, stepwise account of how an agent’s extended experiences
with the world can help her become a moral expert in some moral sub-domain.
Experience, as I’ve argued elsewhere, is a superior means towards becoming a moral
expert which typically can’t be replaced by mere imagination. But importantly, I’m
not arguing that experience is necessary in principle for becoming a moral expert; I’ll
allow for the theoretical (but unlikely) possibility that someone can become a moral
expert without it. Also, the claim isn’t that experience guarantees moral expertise; as
I’ll discuss shortly, many obstacles can stand in the way. All that any prior step does
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is to put one in a position to reach the next step.
Consider some moral sub-domain D, which is characterised by certain
combinations of morally relevant features (m1, m2, m3), in context C involving certain
combinations of non-moral features (n1, n2, n3):

Step 1:

An agent encounters (m1, m2, m3) in the concrete world in context C, by
experiencing it for herself, or witnessing it second-hand.

Step 2:

The agent has some recognition of (m1, m2, m3) as morally significant to
some degree.

Step 3:

Owing to this encounter, or over the course of subsequent encounters
with (m1, m2, m3) in C, the agent becomes sufficiently morally sensitised
such that in future cases where (m1, m2, m3) is present in C, she can
reliably detect and recognise (m1, m2, m3) as morally significant to some
degree.

Step 4:

The agent becomes competent at using this moral sensitivity to reliably
form moral knowledge in moral sub-domain D. In other words, she
becomes a moral expert in D.

Here are some important things to note. First, this process isn’t necessarily tied to
any particular method of responding morally to the world. It’s a pluralistic account
of the faculties which may be involved in moral expertise. One’s ‘recognition’ of the
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moral significance of some morally relevant feature, and one’s ‘moral sensitivity’
which may be used to form moral knowledge, may be realised by one or more
different faculties including or cognitive, affective, and conative faculties. Consider
the example of physical pain. We typically respond to this with negative emotions,
and a desire for it to stop. For almost all human beings, experiencing physical pain
first-hand and responding to it in these ways will be our first insight into its moral
significance. But we often also respond to physical pain in more cognitive ways, by
forming explicit beliefs like ‘the physical pain of a drowning child ought to be
stopped’, and by using moral reasoning to form moral knowledge. This
accommodates the fact that agents have different cognitive, affective, and conative
faculties, and that there are multiple ways in which we respond morally to the world
to form moral knowledge.39
Second, Steps 2 and 3 of the process require agents to recognise the moral
significance of morally relevant features to at least some degree. But this recognition
need not be maximal, such that we e.g. make explicit moral judgments like ‘The pain
I’m experiencing here is morally bad’, or feel intense moral anger at witnessing one’s
colleague being sexually harassed. An agent who merely suspects that something is
39

In this respect, my account of moral expertise bears similarities to Sliwa’s (2017) account of moral
understanding, which she defines as ‘the ability to acquire knowledge’ (546). According to Sliwa, ‘the
capacity of moral understanding can be multiply realised. Plausibly there are many distinct faculties
and cognitive mechanisms by which we acquire moral knowledge: perception, imagination, intuition,
our affective responses, and moral reasoning can all be sources of moral knowledge. … [M]oral
understanding is realised by a set of different faculties and cognitive abilities. Agents can have these
cognitive abilities to different degrees. And so, what exactly grounds the capacity of moral
understanding may vary from agent to agent’ (548). Sliwa, however, argues that one’s ability to form
moral knowledge purely via testimony can count as moral understanding; my account does not allow
for testimonial competence to count as moral expertise.
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morally fishy about the way her boss is treating her colleague, or feels a little upset
that something seems ‘off’, clearly has at least some insight into the moral
significance of the sexual harassment she witnesses.

2.4 Factors which can help and harm experience
Numerous factors can influence how likely an agent is to progress from one step to
the next. Here are just some examples.
First, although moral sensitivity isn’t necessarily tied to any particular faculty,
it’s likely that one’s affective and conative faculties will be especially valuable in
many cases. Consider the following example. The Notre Dame cathedral is currently
engulfed in flames. Given all the information I have, I form the piece of evaluative
knowledge that very many people are suffering a great loss, and that something very
valuable is being damaged. Despite this, I myself have no affective or conative
responses towards the event, since I feel no personal connection towards the
cathedral, or for that matter, historical and cultural artefacts in general. When my
friend says, ‘A lot of people are concerned about Notre Dame burning down, but no
one is talking about where Quasimodo is going to live now,’ I burst out laughing at
his joke, and proceed to post it on Facebook for all to see. My Parisian friend chides
me for propagating the joke to those in mourning while the cathedral is still burning.
But I fail to see why I should take my post down, and believe that she’s overreacting.
Here, my lack of affective and conative sensitivities towards Notre Dame and other
cultural artefacts partly explains why I’ve found the joke so funny. It also explains
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why I fail to be competent at knowing that repeating it to those in mourning as the
cathedral burns is at least morally suberogatory or offensive, despite having a
sufficient amount of information to reason my way to this conclusion. It will be
difficult for me to become a moral expert in how to respond in the wake of tragedies,
at least without any extra help. In general, lacking fitting affective and conative
responses will often, though not always, be an obstacle in the path towards
becoming a moral expert.
Second, one’s background beliefs can influence one’s likelihood of progressing
through the steps, and this can itself be influenced by factors such as one’s
upbringing. Consider Emily, who reliably experiences negative moral emotions
when she witnesses non-human animals suffer. After watching the movie Oldboy,
she experiences disgust and horror when the protagonist eats a live, wriggling
octopus. Emily knows that cephalopods are capable of experiencing large amounts
of physical pain. Her upbringing, however, has conditioned her to believe that eating
live seafood is morally permissible as an integral part of her culture’s eating
practices. So, she ultimately gives a moral pass to the protagonist (and the actor Choi
Min-sik). Here, despite Emily having a large amount of affective insight into the
moral significance of physical pain in non-human animals, her other beliefs stop her
from endorsing her moral emotions, and prevent her from reliably forming moral
knowledge with respect to certain types of moral questions. She fails to progress
from Step 3 to 4, which prevents her from becoming a moral expert in the sub-
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domain of animal ethics.
Third, in many cases, having first-personal experience of certain moral
phenomena seems to boost the likelihood that one will recognise, and to a greater
degree, the moral significance of the morally relevant features present. Consider the
question of whether someone with an eating disorder is at fault for failing to ‘snap
out’ of her condition. One morally relevant consideration here is that her emotions,
desires, beliefs, and visual perception of her own body are subject to a foreign,
manipulative influence. Someone who’s experienced her agency being undermined
in this way is in a better position to recognise its moral significance, and is also in a
better position to recognise this to a greater degree. On the flip side, the experience
of having an eating disorder is sufficiently distinct and dissimilar to most other
‘normal’ human experiences, such that someone who hasn’t experienced this illness
will have a moral epistemic handicap, and will be less competent at knowing on
their own that victims of eating disorders are not to blame for their own condition.
Fourth, when one’s experience isn’t first-personal, witnessing some wrong
being done to others we care about boosts the likelihood that we will recognise the
moral significance of what’s transpired. Someone who sees her mother being
mocked for her ‘funny Asian accent’, for instance, is much more likely to respond
with a greater amount of indignation than another bystander who has no
relationship to the victim of this racist encounter.
Fifth, having access to others with moral expertise can also boost the likelihood
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of one becoming a moral expert. Consulting a therapist, for instance, often helps
those with eating disorders to make sense of their experiences, recognise that they
have a mental illness, and recognise that their self-blame is irrational. And this isn’t
merely a matter of the victim believing her therapist’s testimony that she isn’t to
blame. Undergoing therapy can help her recognise for herself the morally relevant
features of her condition, and put her in an excellent position to develop her own
moral sensitivities.
Sixth, having access to the relevant communities is valuable in a similar way.
It’s common for victims of eating disorders and other mental illnesses to seek out
online or offline communities of other victims. Exchanging experiences, engaging in
collective reasoning, and listening to community members with high levels of moral
expertise, can put an agent in an excellent position to develop her own moral
sensitivities, and become a moral expert in the sub-domain of eating disorders or
mental illness.
The factors which can influence one’s likelihood of becoming a moral expert are
numerous, and the list above isn’t exhaustive by any means. And the particular
factors which tend to be helpful or harmful vary from sub-domain to sub-domain. In
the next section, I’ll discuss the particular factors which tend to help or harm one’s
likelihood of becoming a moral expert in sub-domains of oppression.
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3

Moral Expertise on Oppression

In this section, I’ll argue for one main claim. The main claim is that a member of an
oppressed group is often in a better position to become a moral expert with respect
to the type of oppression experienced by that group. For instance, women are in a
better position than men to become moral experts in the moral sub-domain of
sexism, disabled people are in a better position than the able-bodied to become
moral experts in ableism, fat people are in a better position to become moral experts
in fat-shaming than those who’ve always been thin, and so on.
I'll begin by introducing the nearby concept of the 'standpoint', since my
argument will frequently draw support from what standpoint epistemologists have
to say (3.1). Next, I'll show how the experiences that come with being in an
oppressed group can help one become a moral expert in the moral sub-domain of
that type of oppression. This is because oppressed group members are more likely to
be repeatedly exposed to oppressive phenomena (3.2), and also because they are
more likely to recognise the morally relevant features involved as being morally
significant, become sensitised to this features in the appropriate contexts, and
become competent at using moral sensitivities to form moral knowledge (3.3). Last,
I'll respond to the objection that just as the interests of the privileged are likely to
lead them epistemically astray, the interests of the oppressed are also likely to do the
same (3.4).
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3.1 Standpoint epistemology and moral expertise
Nearby to the notion of becoming a moral expert on oppression is what standpoint
epistemologists have called achieving the ‘standpoint’. I’ll introduce the concept
here, and say what this has to do with moral expertise on oppression, since my
subsequent discussion will draw support from some of the claims made by
standpoint epistemologists.
Nancy Hartsock (1983) defines a standpoint as a 'stance' that reveals to
socially underprivileged knowers the shared nature of their experiences of
oppression, and the systematic structure of power relations. Standpoint theorists
hold that one’s social location—i.e. where one exists along axes of oppression—
influences one’s epistemic privileged, and that the oppressed are much better
positioned to achieve a standpoint than dominant groups.
While there are important differences between my claims and the those that
standpoint epistemologists make, I’ll first focus on the similarities. First, both
occupying a standpoint and being a moral expert on oppression involve having
some type of richer epistemic perspective on the type of oppression faced by the
marginalised group in question. Second, both standpoint theorists and I claim that
being a member of an oppressed group puts on in a better position to have this
richer epistemic perspective on oppression. Third, occupying a standpoint and being
a moral expert on oppression are both products of an achievement, and aren’t
automatically guaranteed by being a member of an oppressed group. Fourth, and
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relatedly, the likelihood of achieving a standpoint and becoming a moral expert on
oppression are influenced by similar factors.
Given these similarities, the following discussion of moral expertise on
oppression will frequently draw on support from standpoint epistemologists. But
readers should not assume that standpoint epistemologists will agree with all of my
claims. In fact, many will disagree with some of my key meta-epistemic
commitments and philosophical methodology.40 On the flip side, readers should also
not assume that I agree with all that standpoint epistemologists have to say, beyond
the similarities I've outlined above. Still, even where there is technical disagreement
between standpoint theorists and I, my account has much to gain from taking many
of their claims metaphorically.

3.2 Being exposed to oppression
In the previous section, I outlined how experience can be a powerful means of
gaining moral expertise. Here, I'll discuss how the experiences that come with being
in an oppressed group can help one become a moral expert in the moral sub-domain
of the oppression experienced by that group.
I'll begin by addressing Step 1 and part of Step 3 of the experience-expertise
process: where an agent encounters, and continues to encounter, combinations of
morally relevant features in the world in the relevant contexts. Oppressed agents are

40

For example, some will reject the notion that there is a class of knowledge which is distinctively
'moral'. Many of them are also likely to reject my account of moral expertise on the grounds that it is
too essentially individualistic.
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much more likely to encounter and be repeatedly exposed to the oppressive
phenomena which are constituted by these features and contexts.
As I noted in the introduction, society is often structured in ways that many
oppressive phenomena are literally obscured from the view of the non-oppressed.
Jaggar notes that the class position of the privileged 'insulates them from the
suffering of the oppressed', such that they 'encounter little in their daily lives that
conflicts' with the belief that 'current organisation of society [is] basically
satisfactory' (2004, 56-57). Consider again the case of catcalling; since most noncatcalling men are rarely privy to the phenomenon, they simply do not encounter the
particular cases in which the morally relevant features related to catcalling are
instantiated. Let’s assume that some wrong-making features of cat-calling are the
unwarranted shame it tends to cause women, the objectification that occurs, the fear
of one’s physical safety that it causes, and its contribution to the constant mental toll
that sexism takes on women in general. Even though many men have experienced
some of these morally relevant features (e.g. unwarranted shame, fear of safety,
mental tolls of various kinds), they are less likely to have experienced some of them
(e.g. objectification), and they are also much less likely to have experienced the
particular combination of these morally relevant features.
An important factor which can influence one's likelihood of encountering
oppression is where one lives. In many societies, this often correlates with one's
social location, defined in terms of class and race. Those who live in higher-income
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neighbourhoods are much less likely to witness the difficulties faced by those
trapped in poverty cycles. And those who live in predominantly white
neighbourhoods (which are also often higher-income neighbourhoods) are much less
likely to witness Black people being treated differently by the police than they are.
One's social circle and community is also an important influence. Once again, this is
often determined by factors like income, race, sexual orientation, and so on.
Someone with no transgender friends, for example, is less likely to witnesses
instances of discrimination faced by the transgender community. They are less likely
to witness someone struggling to decide which bathroom to use in a nightclub, out
of fear of being kicked out for using the 'wrong one'.
Consider also the fact that inequality is one morally relevant feature of
oppression. One can only fully encounter inequality by bearing witness to both
oppression and privilege, and for many types of oppression, marginalised agents
will be much more likely to enjoy this dual perspective. Patricia Hill Collins
discusses the example of how many Black women caretakers have special insight of
this kind:

‘Afro-American women have long been privy to some of the most intimate
secrets of white society. Countless numbers of Black women have ridden
buses to their white “families”, where they not only cooked, cleaned, and
executed other domestic duties, but where they also nurtured their “other”
children. … These women have seen white elites, both actual and aspiring,
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from perspectives largely obscured … from these groups themselves. (Collins
2004, 203).

One thing we can take away from this quote is that members of oppressed groups,
such as Black women, often have jobs that allow them to see how privileged
individuals live in comparison to themselves. This is often true of women, ethnic
minorities, and lower-income individuals, who are disproportionately tasked with
jobs which require them to service the elite. But the privileged typically have no
reason to take a converse peek into the lives of the oppressed. In this sense, the
comparatively privileged nature of their own circumstances is 'obscured from
themselves'.
This asymmetrical exposure to inequality is not limited to cases of servicing
the wealthy. Disabled people, for instance, bear witness to the relative privilege of
able-bodied people every time they leave their homes to interact with the outside
world. They witness the relative ease with which able-bodied people navigate their
physical environments, and observe able-bodied people being able to enter venues
and use facilities which they themselves cannot. Able-bodied people, in contrast, are
much less likely to bear witness to the struggles of disabled people, since the latter
form a minority of the population.
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3.3 Recognising moral significance, being morally sensitised, and
becoming a moral expert
Steps 2, 3, and 4 of the experience-expertise process involve the agent recognising
morally relevant features as being morally significant to some degree, becoming
morally sensitised to those features in the appropriate contexts, and becoming
competent at using her moral sensitivities to form moral knowledge in the relevant
moral sub-domain. Once again, oppressed agents are in a much better position to
make this progress, with respect to the sub-domains of their own oppression.
As I've noted in the previous section, first-personal experience of being
wronged and harmed often puts us in a better position to recognise the moral
significance of what's happened. This is true of the wrongs and harms which
contribute to oppression. Someone who's on the receiving end of a fat-shaming
encounter, for instance, is typically more likely to have a negative moral reaction
towards the event than a thin-bodied witness to this event. Moreover, as I've also
previously noted, witnessing wrongs and harms being done to those we care about
also boosts the likelihood that we'll recognise the moral significance of what's being
done. In moral sub-domains such as racism, marginalised agents will often witness
these oppressive wrongs and harms being done to family members they care about.
Recall the example of someone witnessing his mother being mocked for her Asian
accent; he's more likely than a white stranger to feel indignant at what's happened.
This point extends from family to friends as well, at least when social groups cluster
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along lines of oppression and privilege. The friend who witnesses her transgendered
friend struggling to decide which bathroom to use, for instance, is much more likely
to feel sadness and anger at her friend's predicament than a stranger listening to
their conversation. And as I've noted in the previous section, affect is often an
especially powerful tool when it comes to moral recognition, and developing moral
sensitivity. In many cases of oppression, an oppressed person being wronged or
harmed, or witnessing someone they care about being wronged or harmed, will
respond with greater amounts of affect than someone who is not a member of that
oppressed group.
Experience which is likely to trigger moral recognition need not always be of
wrongs and harms in order for one to be in a better position to make certain moral
judgments about oppression. For example, Jaggar (2004) notes that 'it is only from
the standpoint of women that household labour becomes visible as work rather than
a labour of love'. Having to do household labour is not a wrong or harm in itself. It
does, however, put women who are relegated this role in a better position to
recognise that their love for their family members does not generate a moral duty for
them to take on household responsibilities for free. It also puts them in a better
position to recognise that women are being unfairly treated if their household labour
isn't treated as work, when their husbands' non-household jobs are.
The interests of oppressed agents can also push them in the direction of
recognising the moral significance of oppressive phenomena, becoming morally
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sensitised to it, and eventually becoming competent at forming moral knowledge
about it. On the other hand, non-marginalised groups often have interests in
maintaining is not as prevalent or bad as it really is, or that what they witness is not
really oppressive. This point about interests is a popular sentiment amongst
standpoint epistemologists. Jaggar, for example, says the following about the
purported 'knowledge' perpetuated by the dominant class:

‘In a society where the production of [purported] knowledge is controlled by
a certain class, the [purported] knowledge produced will reflect the interests
and values of that class. … Because the ruling class has an interest in
concealing the ways in which it dominates and exploits the rest of the
population, the interpretation of reality that it presents will be distorted in
characteristic ways. In particular, the suffering of the subordinate classes will
be ignored, redescribed as enjoyment or justified as freely chosen, deserved,
or inevitable.
‘Because their class position insulates them from the suffering of the
oppressed, many members of the ruling class are likely to be convinced by
their own ideology; either they fail to perceive the suffering of the oppressed
or they believe that it is freely chosen, deserved, or inevitable. They
experience the current organisation of society as basically satisfactory and so
they accept the interpretation of reality that justifies that system of
organisation. They encounter little in their daily lives that conflicts with that
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interpretation.
‘Oppressed groups, by contrast, suffer directly from the system that
oppresses them. Sometimes the ruling ideology succeeds in duping them into
partial denial of their pain or into accepting it temporarily, but the
pervasiveness, intensity, and relentlessness of their suffering constantly push
oppressed groups toward a realisation that something is wrong with the
prevailing social order.
‘The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from that of the
ruling class; it is also epistemologically advantageous.’ (Jaggar 2004, 56-57)

Similar sentiments also exist in the Marxist literature. Grasswick describes the
Marxist materialism developed by Georg Lukács, who describes the epistemic
asymmetry as one of 'understanding':

‘One’s social position with respect to material labour is inversely related to
one’s epistemic position. … As the privileged class, the capitalists have a
motivation to maintain the status quo, and this interest interferes in their
ability to understand the exploitation of the working class upon which their
capitalist privilege depends. The working class, however, as the socially
underprivileged, can achieve a richer understanding of social relations;
they ... have a motivation to understand the true nature of the exploitation to
which they are subject (in order to be able to end the exploitation). ... Thus,
their position as socially underprivileged affords them the possibility of an
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epistemic privilege’. (Grasswick 2016, 14-15).

Whether they recognise it or not, members of privileged groups often have interests
in maintaining false beliefs about oppression, since maintaining the status quo
benefits them; the converse is true about members of oppressed groups. Not only
can this affect the production of knowledge and moral expertise, it can plausibly also
affect the likelihood of one being affectively, conatively, or cognitively responsive to
oppression in the right ways.

3.4 The objectivity objection
At this point, a natural worry arises about the influence of interests on how likely an
agent is to become a moral expert on oppression. What I've just claimed is that the
interests of the marginalised make them more likely to become moral experts on
their own oppression, whereas the interests of the privileged make them less likely
to do the same. To put things another way, I've claimed that the moral perspective of
the marginalised is more objective than that of the privileged, when it comes to
matters of oppression. To some, this might seem too convenient. In general, when we
think about two agents with contrasting interests, we tend to think that each of their
perspectives are likely to be distorted in opposite directions. Neither party is in a
good position to be objective, and both are likely to make just as many false
judgments about the matter. Call this the 'objectivity objection'.
With respect to moral expertise on oppression, this objection is largely
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unfounded. First, note that there are obvious historical counter-examples to this
claim. One such case is that of Afro-American slavery. White slaveholders had
interests in maintaining that slavery was morally permissible, while Black slaves had
interests in maintaining that it was not. Yet, it's clearly false that each set of interests
was equally epistemically distorting. Moreover, the interests of Black slaves were not
just non-distorting, or less distorting—they were positively truth-tracking. This leads
to a broader point, which is that the objectivity objection rests on the false
assumption that interests must always be distorting, and can never be truth-tracking.
Louise Antony (1993) acknowledges that although 'biases' are an inevitable
component of knowing, it's ultimately an empirical question as to which biases are
epistemically good or bad.
So, when is there likely to be an epistemic asymmetry in the value of
contrasting biases? One simple answer is that this tends to happen when one party
has interests in maintaining some deception or falsehood, while the other has
interests in uncovering the deception. Both Jaggar and Lukács appeal to this idea.
But this may be unsatisfying to some since often, the very question at stake is
whether or not some deception is at play. Although this is an epistemic worry, since
in these cases there is a fact of the matter, it's still worth thinking about how we can
identify which party is which. One question we can ask is whether there seems to be
an existing external force which has a clear interest in both parties believing
something irrespective of its truth, and which also has the power to influence one or
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both parties into doing so. There are clear non-moral examples of this. Consider the
powerful influence of the American pharmaceutical industry, which gives us reason
to believe that the financial interests of doctors with respect to prescribing certain
medications are epistemically distorting, whereas the interests of patients in
maintaining their health are truth-tracking.41
Many cases of oppression will be like this. The powerful, external distorting
force at play is what philosophers sometimes call the dominant 'ideology'. Ideology,
roughly, is the set of ideas, ways of thinking, and beliefs predominant in society.
Ideology which is oppressive is influenced by at least two things. The first is the
group of privileged individuals who are aware of the truths about oppression, but
perpetrate falsehoods about it anyway, such as owners of sweatshops who know
their workers are being perniciously exploited. The second influence on ideology is
the set of structural forces either produced by these agents in the know, or produced
non-agentially by causes such as the natural tendency for society to be structured in
certain ways without intervention. One example of the latter is the tendency for
physical environments to be built for the convenience of the able-bodied, since they
41

The privatised pharmaceutical industry in America has financial interests in getting both doctors
and patients to believe that their medication is the safest and most effective solution to most health
problems, irrespective of whether this is the case. The result of this is that doctors have interests in
maintaining that this is true, since they often receive financial incentives from pharmaceutical
companies to prescribe those medications. Moreover, evidence suggests that these incentives are often
powerful enough to outweigh the goodwill or medical expertise of doctors; research shows, for
instance, that doctors who receive more money from opioid manufacturers are significantly more
likely to prescribe opioids to their patients. Patients, on the other hand, should be motivated to find
out what is in fact the truth, since it's in their best interests to follow the course of action which would
best improve their health. The result of this is that we have reason to think that the interests of doctors
with respect to the matter are more epistemically distorting than the interests of patients, which are
much more truth-tracking.
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form the majority of the population. Another example is the tendency for women's
careers rather than men's to take a hit after childbirth, since without intervention it
often makes more financial sense for women rather than men to put their careers on
hold after childbirth.
The 'interest' that oppressive ideology has in perpetrating itself comes both
from the interests of malicious, privileged individuals, as well as the inertia society
must overcome in order to structure itself in opposition to the contents of that
ideology. Once we examine the contents of the dominant ideology, it is easy to
identify some cases in which privileged individuals have interests in maintaining the
status quo, and cases in which oppressed individuals have interests in uncovering
the truth. Given the natural tendency for physical environments to be built for the
able-bodied, and the extra resources it would take to accommodate disabled people,
we have good reason to think that the moral sensitivities of the able-bodied are likely
to be distorted when it comes to moral judgments about ableism, and that those of
disabled people are likely to be truth-tracking. Given that sweatshop owners have
interests in maintaining that their employees' working conditions are morally
permissible, irrespective of the truth, we have good reason to think that the moral
sensitivities of many consumers are likely to be distorted due to their interests in
keeping their cost of living low, and that the sensitivities of sweatshop workers are
likely to be truth-tracking.
This type of reasoning can serve as a good epistemic guide to determine the
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epistemic value of biases in some cases of oppression. But we must be careful not to
think that it will help us uncover all of them. It's unclear, for instance, as to how
forms of oppression such as fat-shaming fit into this picture (especially since the
powerful fast food industry has interests in maintaining that there are no moral
problems with obesity).
Ultimately, though, this epistemic worry shouldn't keep us from thinking that
there are many more truth-tracking biases than we can readily identify. Standpoint
epistemologists have had much more to say about the false assumption that
epistemic objectivity necessarily involves 'neutrality' or a lack of interests. Sandra
Harding notes that examining cases of oppression gives rise to a 'critique of
conventional epistemic standards', and reason to think that 'what Donna Haraway
dubbed 'the God Trick'—the traditional epistemic view that knowledge is only
achieved

by

adopting

a

disinterested,

impartial

view

from

nowhere—is

unachievable, for knowledge is always from somewhere' (Harding 2004, 93). Alison
Wylie also argues that such cases 'explicitly undermine the assumption that objective
epistemic agents are non-specifically located, and that they are neutral and
disinterested with respect to the subject of their inquiry' (Wylie 2004, 345-356).

100

4

Conclusion

My main claim has been that a member of an oppressed group is often in a better
position to become a moral expert with respect to the type of oppression experienced
by that group. So far, I've only discussed the epistemic advantages that come with
being an oppressed group member. But being oppressed is no guarantee that one
will become a moral expert on the type of oppression one experiences, and I haven't
discussed the specific factors which can prevent oppressed agents from becoming
moral experts on their own oppression. Although I lack the space for a full
discussion of the matter, here is a brief one.
The biggest obstacle, with respect to many types of oppression, will be
oppression that marginalised agents have internalised. Here is Jaggar:

‘The daily experience of oppressed groups provides them with an immediate
awareness of their own suffering but they do not perceive immediately the
underlying causes of their own suffering nor even necessarily perceive it as
oppression. Their understanding is obscured both by the prevailing ideology
and by the very structure of their lives.
‘In addition to the mystifications created by the dominant ideology and by
the structure of our lives, … women face another obstacle … The obstacle is
the typically feminine set of attitudes and modes of perception that have been

101

imposed on women in a male-dominated society. … While women’s
experience of subordination puts them in a uniquely advantageous position
for reinterpreting reality, it also imposes on them certain psychological
difficulties which must themselves be the focus of a self-conscious struggle.
‘Simply to be a woman, then, is not sufficient to guarantee a clear
understanding of the world.’ (Jaggar 2004, 60-61)

Many survivors of sexual assault, for example, have been conditioned by prevailing
societal attitudes to feel shame and self-blame. Many women incorrectly endorse
these emotions, and believe that they are in fact to blame for their own sexual
assault. As Jaggar notes, a ‘self-conscious struggle’ against such emotions is
necessary for women to recognise that these emotions are a misleading product of
their upbringing and environment.
Another obstacle which often hinders marginalised agents is the phenomenon
of hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice, as defined by Fricker (2007),
occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation (i.e. the
collective hermeneutical resource), such that marginalised social groups are at a
disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Before
the term ‘sexual harassment’ was coined, for instance, many women had an
impoverished, scattered understanding of being sexually harassed, and were
hindered from forming moral knowledge about the wrong being done to them.
Having thick ethical concepts like ‘sexual harassment’ greatly increases one’s ability
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to form certain types of moral judgments. More recent sexist moral phenomena that
have been collectively identified include ‘mansplaining’, ‘he-peating’, and ‘correctile
dysfunction’; having names for these phenomena have allowed many women to
make sense of their experiences, identify them more confidently in the future,
confidently and justifiably recognise that they are being wronged when they
experience these phenomena, and form moral knowledge. But there are undoubtedly
a great number of oppressive phenomena that have yet to be given a name, and this
provides an obstacle towards moral expertise with respect to various types of
oppression.
Related to these two points is the importance of community in influencing
how likely one is to become a moral expert. In Section 1, I noted that having access to
communities comprised of others with similar experiences can boost the likelihood
of one becoming a moral expert. Whether or not such communities exist for
oppressed agents can greatly harm or hinder their chances. Exchanging experiencing
and engaging in collective reasoning can boost the likelihood that oppressed agents
will engage in Jaggar's 'self-conscious struggle' against harmful psychology, and it
can also boost the likelihood that oppressive phenomena will be given names, and
that hermeneutical justice will prevail.
To wrap things up, I’ve applied an experience-based picture of moral
expertise to the moral phenomena of oppression. I’ve discussed how being a
member of a marginalised group puts one in a better position to become a moral
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expert with respect to the moral sub-domain of the oppression experienced by that
group, as opposed to non-members of that group. But I’ve also noted how being
oppressed doesn’t guarantee that one will become such a moral expert, and briefly
listed just some obstacles that can stand in the way.
Importantly, what’s been said in this paper is by no means intended to be
exhaustive, or universal to all types of oppression. There are many forms of
oppression, and each of them comes with unique features and complications. This
cursory analysis of oppressions in general has highlighted the richness and
complexity of how moral expertise operates in the real world, and zooming into
specific forms of oppression even further will reveal even more.
Last, this discussion has important epistemic implications for whether, and
under what circumstances, we should defer to members of marginalised groups
when they give moral testimony about their own oppression. In certain
circumstances, privileged individuals will have strong reason to do this, but as the
discussion of obstacles to expertise has highlighted, one must be discerning about
when and how to do this. This is a matter for another paper.
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Chapter 3
Virtuous & Worthy Moral Deference

1

Introduction

Consider the following case:

Halloween. Joel is attending an Intro to Ethics recitation. The class is discussing
the ethics of Halloween costumes, which he’s never thought about before.
Because Joel has a history midterm right after class, he isn’t paying attention.
Rather, he’s reciting historical facts about minstrel shows in his head. At the
end of class, Joel hears his TA state that she herself thinks donning blackface
for Halloween is wrong. Joel leaves class having no clue why anyone would
have this view. He also has no feelings about either blackface or minstrely. He
knows they upset the African American community, but thinks everything
seems to upset someone anyway. Still, he believes his TA. Whenever she’s
explained her moral views in the past, he’s always been able to grasp her
explanations, and has always agreed with her conclusions. Joel, a white man,
decides not to paint his face black and dress up as Black Panther for
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Halloween. When asked why, he says, ‘It would be wrong. My TA said so.
Come to think of it, I don’t know why. But I want to do what’s right.’

Something's off about Joel. But before I delve into our intuitions about Halloween,
here are several things to note about the case. First, Joel’s engaged in the epistemic
practice of pure moral deference. This is the practice of forming and sustaining some
moral belief p, solely based on someone else’s purely moral testimony that p. What
makes this pure, rather than impure, moral deference is that the testimony and
deference is of an entirely moral, non-empirical nature. Let’s assume that the
empirical facts Joel knows are sufficient for someone else with the exact same
information to figure out the wrongness of blackface on Halloween on their own.
This includes facts about minstrely, facts about race relations in America, and the fact
that blackface angers the African American community. Joel already has all the nonmoral information he needs; he’s just incompetent at putting these pieces of the
moral puzzle together. So the new belief he accepts is purely moral, and isn’t formed
or sustained on the basis of any empirical information he lacks.
Second, Joel’s new belief plausibly meets the standards of moral knowledge,
and he’s successfully engaged in pure moral deference. The broad consensus in the
literature on pure moral deference is that this is possible. Let’s say Joel’s TA is indeed
a reliable source of moral information, and Joel justifiably believes that he himself is
pretty good at discerning good moral explanations from bad ones (he just isn’t great
at forming true moral beliefs on his on). The fact that he’s been able to follow his
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TA’s explanations in the past, and the fact that he has always agreed with her
conclusions, provide justification for for his true belief that donning blackface for
Halloween is wrong. It’s no accident that Joel has stumbled upon this true belief. He
demonstrates a competence at forming moral knowledge via pure moral deference.
Now, intuitively, Joel hasn’t met the standards of an ideal moral agent. He
doesn’t seem to believe as well as he can, or act as well as he can when he acts on his
new belief. This is despite the fact that his new moral belief counts as knowledge,
and the fact that he’s competent at deferring in order to acquire moral knowledge.
This is also despite the fact that he demonstrates a concern for doing the right thing,
and acquires moral knowledge in order to do so. When Joel believes that donning
blackface on Halloween is wrong based on his TA’s say-so, and acts on that belief, he
still seems to miss out on something important.
Those in the debate over pure moral deference have various things to say
about cases like Halloween. I take the most substantive threat against the practice to
be what I call the reasons unresponsiveness observation. Philosophers have made this
observation in various forms. The broad point is that even when we’re successful in
using pure moral deference to acquire moral knowledge that p, we can still fail to
respond in valuable ways to the moral reasons that make p true. First, agents can be
unresponsive to moral reasons by failing to have cognitive moral understanding of the
reasons why p is true. Joel, for instance, doesn’t intellectually grasp why all the
empirical facts that he knows make donning blackface for Halloween wrong.
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Second, agents can be unresponsive to reasons by failing to have fitting affect in
response to the features that ground the moral reasons why p is true. Joel lacks the
outrage that’s fitting for him to have in response to the ugly facts he knows about
minstrely.
The reasons unresponsiveness observation seems to reflect badly on the
practice of pure moral deference, as well as agents who defer. Here are two potential
negative implications of the observation. First, it’s been argued than an agent’s
actions can’t have moral worth if she doesn’t have cognitive moral understanding.
Second, it’s been argued that being cognitively and affectively unresponsive to moral
reasons signals a lack of virtue in the agent herself. If this is true, then Joel isn’t being
a virtuous moral agent, and his decision not to don blackface for Halloween doesn’t
have moral worth.
The main aim of this paper is to vindicate pure moral deference, and agents
who defer, in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness observation. In certain
contexts, it’s important for agents to be motivated by a concern for doing the right
thing in itself. In particular, I’ll argue for the following claim:

The contextual claim about moral worth: In contexts C where an agent’s
unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes her
incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons, her act of ϕ-ing has
moral worth if (i) she’s motivated to ϕ by a concern for doing the right thing,
and (ii) she’s competent at ϕ-ing based on this concern.
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I’ll also argue for the existence of the following two virtues:

The virtue of acting for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using her
concern for doing the right thing to perform right actions, in contexts where
because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using
her concern for doing the right thing to form moral knowledge, in contexts
where because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

Pure moral deference, practiced in the right way as Joel has, is a way for agents to
meet the standards of the contextual claim. This mitigates our worries about moral
worth. It’s also a way for agents to exercise the virtues of acting and knowing for
rightness’ sake. This mitigates our worries about virtue. My account won’t conclude
that there’s nothing missing whatsoever in agents like Joel; of course there is. But
he’s a much better moral agent than some would have us think.
Here’s how I’ll proceed. In Section 2, I’ll outline the reasons unresponsiveness
observation, and how it creates worries for pure moral deference and agents who
practices it. In Section 3, I’ll argue for the contextual claim about moral worth, and
show how this mitigates worries about moral worth for deference. In Section 3, I’ll
argue for the existence of the two virtues of acting and knowing for rightness’ sake,
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and show how this mitigates worries about virtue for deference. I’ll wrap up by
responding to some possible objections to my account.

2

The threat of reasons unresponsiveness

In this section, I’ll outline the reasons unresponsiveness observation about pure
moral deference, and how it threatens the status of the practice as well as agents who
engage in it. Recall that pure moral deference is the practice of forming and
sustaining some moral belief p, solely based on someone else’s purely moral
testimony that p is true. The reasons unresponsiveness observation is that even when
we’re successful in using pure moral deference to acquire moral knowledge that p,
we can still fail to respond in valuable ways to the moral reasons that make p true.
Here’s how this section will go. First, I’ll explain what I mean by moral
reasons (2.1). I’ll then discuss how deferring agents can fail to respond to them both
cognitively and affectively (2.2). Next, I’ll discuss what successful deferrers are
typically responding to instead, and why (2.3). This is the moral truth, out of a noninstrumental concern for doing the right thing. Last, I’ll discuss two threats that the
reasons unresponsiveness observation poses (2.4). These are lack of morally worthy
action, and lack of virtue.

2.1 Moral reasons
Moral reasons are what we hope to express when justifying our moral beliefs and
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actions to other. They are what ground the truth of moral facts. Consider the
following example. Suppose I correctly believe kicking people on a whim is wrong,
and correspondingly refrain from doing so. Some statements I could use to justify
my belief and actions are ‘It would cause others physical pain’, ‘It would fail to
maximise the moral good’, ‘Kicking people on a whim is cruel’, or ‘We ought to
maximise the moral good’. These are all sensible things to say to someone who asks
me to justify myself. These statements express moral reasons.
I’ll follow the broad philosophical consensus in holding that moral reasons
are facts (see e.g. Raz 1975; Scanlon 1998). The moral reasons I express above are ‘the
fact that kicking others on a whim would cause them physical pain’, ‘the fact that
doing so would fail to maximise the moral good’, and so on.
Moral reasons come in different levels of abstraction. The most ground-level
sorts are those like ‘the fact that kicking people on a whim would cause others
physical pain’. These are the particular empirical facts which ground the moral
status of actions or status of affairs. Those in debates about morally worthy action
commonly refer to these as ‘right-making reasons’ or ‘right-making features’,
‘wrong-making reasons’ or ‘wrong-making features’, or ‘morally relevant features’.42
These ground-level moral reasons can ground more abstract moral reasons
which are normative, as opposed to empirical, facts. For example, the empirical fact

42

McNaughton & Rawling (2018) refer to these as ‘tier one facts’, on a two-tier view of normative
reasons (174). Yetter Chappell (2018) refers to these as the facts involved in ‘ground-level moral
explanations’, as opposed to those involved in ‘criterial moral explanations’ (9).
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that I’d cause others physical pain by kicking them is what partially grounds the
normative fact that doing so would fail to maximise the moral good. The
combination of empirical details about kicking others on a whim is also what
grounds the fact that doing so would be cruel43.
On an even more abstract level, there are the moral reasons which are
normative facts about more general moral truths, untethered from the case at hand.
These are moral reasons like ‘the fact that we ought to maximise the moral good’, or
‘the fact that something is cruel is a moral reason not to do it’. These kinds of moral
reasons are the ones which give the ones above their very status as moral reasons.

2.2 The reasons unresponsiveness observation
Agents who successfully practice pure moral deference to acquire moral knowledge
that p can fail to respond, in various important ways, to the moral reasons that make
p true. I’ll focus on two such ways: cognitive moral understanding, and fitting affect.

(i)

Missing out on cognitive moral understanding

The type of cognitive moral understanding I’ll discuss is the type invoked by Hills
(2009). Cognitive moral understanding involves a grasp of the relationship between
a moral proposition p, and the reasons why p is true (101). It is a sort of know-how,
rather than knowing-that. It isn’t equivalent to merely knowing the facts that
constitute the reasons why p is true, as Joel does in Halloween. Neither is it equivalent
43

These are what McNaughton & Rawling (2018) refer to ‘tier two facts’ (174).
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to believing, or even knowing, that these facts constitute the moral reasons that
make p true (104).
Full cognitive moral understanding involves a grasp of all the kinds of
reasons I’ve outlined in the previous subsection44. However, it’s implausible to think
that an agent has cognitive moral understanding only if she has a maximal grasp of
all such reasons. As Hills acknowledges, there’s a sufficient threshold of the
possession and grasp of moral reasons, above which an agent counts as having
cognitive moral understanding45.
The causal explanation for why pure moral deference fails to guarantee
cognitive moral understanding is twofold. First, an agent can defer to statements like
‘p’, and ‘p is true’, which don’t contain any moral reasons as their content. Second, an
agent can defer to statements which do contain moral reasons, such as ‘p, and p is
true because q’. But so long as she doesn’t grasp the relationship between p and q,
the agent still lacks cognitive moral understanding.46

44

Hills invokes all these kinds of reasons when she describes agents with moral understanding. (i)
Ground-level moral reasons, constituted by empirical facts: The fact that animals suffer under modern
farming methods is a moral reason not to eat animals (100). (ii) More abstract moral reasons,
constituted by normative facts grounded by empirical facts: The fact that someone is a person is a
moral reason not to kill her (115). (iii) Moral reasons constituted by facts about general moral
obligations: The question of whether we ought to maximise welfare is relevant to understanding why
eating meat is wrong (100).
45
For Hills, although moral understanding requires ‘at least to some extent, a systematic grasp of
morality’, and that ‘there might be a cutoff point before which you do not count as having moral
understanding’, this is not to say that ‘you need to have a grasp of anything that could be morally
important’ (Hills 2009, 103).
46
Additionally, the problem isn't just that pure moral deference 'doesn't guarantee' cognitively moral
understanding. Pure moral deference seems to be mutually exclusive with grasping the relationship
between p and the moral reasons why p is true. Cognitive moral understanding is presumably the sort
of thing for which once you have it, your belief typically comes to be substantively based on this
understanding.
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(ii)

Missing out on fitting affect

The second way in which a successful deferring agent can fail to respond to moral
reasons is by failing to demonstrate fitting affect in response to the properties that
generate these moral reasons. For example, one moral reason why donning blackface
on Halloween is wrong is the fact that it causes the African American community to
suffer. When one witnesses this suffering, or imagines it, it’s fitting to respond with
emotions like outrage on the community’s behalf. Most of us think there’s something
sub-par about someone who doesn’t, like Joel.
Typically, we experience moral affect in response to the ground-level
properties of cases, such as particular instances of suffering. What about features
which generate more abstract reasons, like cruelty? It’s controversial as to whether
we typically do, or can, directly respond to such things with affect.47 In any case,
nothing much about what I’ll say hinges on this possibility.
Pure moral deference, obviously, fails to guarantee emotional responses of
this nature (e.g. Howell 2014; Enoch 2014; Lord FC). There’s something
inappropriate, even, about an agent who acquires affective reactions immediately
upon accepting someone else’s moral testimony.
Here’s one last note. On Hills’ view, moral understanding is cognitive. But

47

My own view is that one can directly respond emotionally to higher-level moral features like
cruelty. Not everyone will agree that this is possible, or agree that this is typical. For instance, Enoch
(2014) notes that emotionally responding to ‘second-order wrongs’ like ‘the subjection of others to
unacceptably high risk’ is atypical, although possible (28).
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other views hold that moral understanding involves precisely the type of affective
responses I’m discussing here (e.g. Lord FC). So, deference doesn’t just fail to
guarantee the cognitive type of moral understanding Hills adopts. It also fails to
guarantee moral understanding on any view which holds that affective responses to
the properties which generate moral reasons are necessary.

2.3 Responding to moral truth, out of a concern for doing the right thing
We’ve seen how agents can successfully practice pure moral deference, but still fail
to respond to moral reasons in important ways. But agents who are competent at
forming knowledge via deference must be responding to something. What is this
something, and why are they responding to it?
Perhaps successful deferrers are responding to moral testimony itself. One
thing we can say Joel is responding to is ‘his TA’s say-so’ when he defers. But merely
responding to moral testimony isn’t good enough for deference to transmit moral
knowledge. Not just any old testimony, picked out in any old way, will do. In order
for deference to be successful, agents must be aiming, and be competent and
successful at aiming, at some further feature that moral testimony can have.
What successful deferrers are aiming at is the moral truth. And agents who
aim for the moral truth typically do so out of a non-instrumental concern for doing the
right thing in itself. Although deference is an epistemic practice, beliefs guide action,
and one is typically interested in acquiring true moral beliefs so that one can perform
right actions. I’ll follow Sliwa (2016) in adopting the following definition of what a

115

‘concern for doing the right thing’ is. To demonstrate ‘concern’ is to experience
conative states such as desires and intentions with respect to what one is concerned
about. To demonstrate concern for doing what’s right includes having desires and
intentions etc. to do what’s right. This concern is non-instrumental; an agent who is
concerned about doing what’s right cares about doing what’s right for its own sake.
As for ‘doing the right thing’, this includes not just performing actions that are
morally required, but also those that are supererogatory and permissible (395-396).
I say that truth-aiming moral agents are ‘typically’ demonstrating a concern
for doing the right thing, because it’s also possible to demonstrate an independent
non-instrumental concern for believing moral truths (or truths in general). I think it’s
quite common for agents to simultaneously be concerned with both doing the right
thing in itself, and believing the truth in itself. But I lack the space to discuss this
here, and will set the matter aside.

2.4 The threat of the reasons unresponsiveness observation
At this point, readers might be persuaded that failing to have cognitive moral
understanding and fitting affect is bad in itself. But the case against pure moral
deference, and agents who defer, becomes even stronger when we consider some
more negative implications that seem to follow. Cognitive moral understanding and
fitting affect seem to ground other valuable moral goods. It’s been argued that such
goods fail to be demonstrated or acquired when an agent succeeds at pure moral
deference. I’ll focus on two such candidates: morally worthy action, and virtue.
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(i)

Lack of morally worthy action

Moral worth is a property of actions. What it means for an action to have moral
worth, roughly, is that the agent deserves credit for her success in performing that
right action (Sliwa 2016, 395). An action being right doesn’t suffice for moral worth;
the action must have been performed well. An agent who performs some right action
by accident, for instance, doesn’t perform actions with moral worth.
The worry for pure moral deference is that when agents act on deferential
beliefs, those actions fail to have moral worth, because they fail to be performed in
response to moral reasons that make that action right. According to Hills, actions are
morally worthy only if they are right actions performed for the right reasons, which
one has cognitively grasped as reasons to act (113-119).

(ii)

Lack of virtue

Virtue is a property of agents. While philosophers disagree on what virtue requires,
most agree on at least two things. First, an agent counts as maximally virtuous only
if she has some specified kind, or kinds, of sensitivity towards moral reasons.
Second, this specified kind, or kinds, of sensitivity is either of a cognitive sort, an
affective sort, or both. If both of these claims are true, then the reasons
unresponsiveness observation threatens to mean that successful deferrers aren’t
virtuous.
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Hills is explicit that cognitive moral understanding is necessary for virtue,
and that this is something that makes the practice of pure moral deference bad
(108-113). But she also indicates that other types of responses to moral reasons are
required for virtue, including affect (112).48 Howell is similar to Hills, in the sense
that he thinks full virtue involves (amongst other things) both cognitive moral
understanding (406-407), and fitting affect towards towards e.g. suffering (404-405).
But unlike Hills, he argues that it’s the deferring agent herself that’s sub-optimal,
rather than the practice of deference itself (409).

3

The contextual claim about moral worth

So far, I’ve discussed the reasons unresponsiveness observation for pure moral
deference, and how this threatens to mean that successful deferring agents can’t
perform morally worthy actions, and lack virtue.
I’ll now begin my defense of pure moral deference and agents who practice it.
In this section, I’ll show how it’s possible for successful deferring agents to act on
their deferential knowledge with moral worth. This will involve vindicating the
practice of being motivated to act by a concern for doing the right thing, as opposed
to being motivated by moral reasons, in certain contexts. In particular, I’ll argue for

48

According to Hills, ‘a good, virtuous person is someone whose whole self—her thoughts, decisions,
feelings, and emotions as well as her actions—is structured by her sensitivity to [moral
reasons]’ (Hills 2009, 112).
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the following claim:

The contextual claim about moral worth: In contexts C where an agent’s
unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes her
incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons, her act of ϕ-ing has
moral worth if (i) she’s motivated to ϕ by a concern for doing the right thing,
and (ii) she’s competent at ϕ-ing based on this concern.

Here’s a note about this claim. Moral worth comes in degrees. All that the contextual
claim says is that an agent who fulfils these requirements performs an action with
some moral worth. My goal isn’t to argue such an action has maximal moral worth.
For now, I'll start by outlining the existing debate over whether morally
worthy actions must be motivated by a concern for doing the right thing, or a
concern for moral reasons (3.1). Next, I’ll argue for part (i) of the contextual claim
(3.2). Then, I’ll argue for part (ii) of the contextual claim (3.3). Next, I’ll explain why I
define contexts C in terms of incompetence (3.4).
Finally, I’ll explain how this mitigates worries about moral worth for pure
moral deference, in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness observation (3.5).
Successfully practicing pure moral deference, and acting on the basis of deferential
knowledge, is one way of meeting the requirements of the contextual claim. So, it is
one way of performing actions with moral worth.
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3.1

The motives for action debate

Quite separately of the debate on pure moral deference, there’s another lively
philosophical debate over what sort of motives are necessary or sufficient for an
agent’s actions to have moral worth.
This debate has its origins in Kant (1785), who argued that an agent acts with
moral worth only if she’s motivated to act out of a concern for doing the right thing,
or by the very fact that the action is right. This is the type of motivation that Joel
demonstrates when he listens to his TA, and acts based on her testimony. In contrast,
Smith’s (1994) well-known argument against externalist accounts of reasons for
action held that good agents act directly on the basis of right-making features, rather
than a non-instrumental concern for doing what’s right.
Here are two necessary claims one can make about motivations and moral
worth. Philosophers hold these claims in various combinations:

(1) In all contexts, an agent's right act of ϕ-ing has moral worth only if her ϕing is motivated by the moral reasons that make ϕ-ing right.

(2) In all contexts, an agent's right act of ϕ-ing has moral worth only if her ϕing is motivated by a concern for doing the right thing.

One could accept (1), but reject (2). In other words, morally worthy actions are
performed on the basis of moral reasons, and a concern for doing the right thing isn't
necessary (e.g. Smith 1994, Arpaly 2002 & 2003, Markovits 2010). Alternatively, one

120

could accept (2), and reject (1). On this view, morally worthy actions are motivated
by a concern for doing the right thing, and acting on the basis of moral reasons isn't
necessary (e.g. Sliwa 2016, Johnson King FC). Last but not least, the most demanding
view accepts both (1) and (2). On this view, morally worthy actions are motivated
both by a concern for doing the right thing, and by moral reasons (Singh 2018).
I reject claim (1), and remain neutral on (2). What I’ll argue for in this section
is a contextual claim about what sort of motivation is sufficient in contexts which fit a
certain description. Here’s the claim I make:

The contextual claim about moral worth: In contexts C where an agent’s
unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes her
incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons, her act of ϕ-ing has
moral worth if (i) she is motivated to ϕ by a concern for doing the right thing,
and (ii) she is competent at ϕ-ing based on this concern.

I'll now proceed to defend this contextual claim.

3.2 Defending the contextual claim: part (i)
I’ll start by motivating part (i) of the claim with some cases. Here’s a case adapted
from Lillehammer (1997):

Temptation. Teresa is tired of her husband. At a party, she meets a charming
woman and is tempted to have an affair. She judges that this would be wrong
on account of her husband’s feelings. She’s temporarily indifferent to his
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feelings, however, because she’s still mad with him for not helping out with
the dishes last night. Out of a concern for doing the right thing, Tammy
doesn’t have the affair. (Adapted from Lillehammer 1997, 192)

Teresa’s husband’s feelings generate a moral reason for her not to have the affair. She
is conatively and affectively unresponsive to this reason. This unresponsiveness
makes her unmotivated, and hence incompetent, at doing the right thing based on
that reason. This is despite the fact that Teresa has cognitive moral understanding of
why her husband’s feelings makes having the affair wrong. One can be responsive to
moral reasons in some ways, but unresponsive to them in other ways, that overall
decreases one’s motivation to do the right thing based on those reasons.
Teresa’s concern for doing the right thing stops her from doing the wrong
thing. Intuitively, her action has some amount of moral worth. This is despite the fact
that she experiences recalcitrant emotions and desires. We might even think that her
action has moral worth because of the fact that she experiences recalcitrant emotions
and desires, and demonstrates the admirable willpower not to act on them. This
lends intuitive support to the contextual claim. Consider the next case, which does
the same:

Changing One’s Mind. Before today, Chuck has always believed that morality
isn’t very demanding in terms of individual sacrifice. But after reading
Famine, Affluence, and Morality, he can’t help concluding that he’s morally
required to donate much of what he has to the distant needy. He’s still
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reluctant to do this. And despite trying his best to imagine the suffering of the
distant needy, his imagination isn’t good enough to generate much emotion.
Despite this, and out of concern for doing the right thing, he proceeds to
donate half of his savings to charity. (Adapted from Lillehammer 1997, 191)

Like Teresa, Chuck’s action intuitively has some amount of moral worth. Many
agents in contexts C will be like Teresa and Chuck. They will have cognitive moral
understanding of moral reasons, but will lack the motivation to perform right
actions because they lack the appropriate emotions and desires. This is no surprise,
given the links between emotions, desires, and motivation. Not all cases are like this,
however:

Humility. Huifen loves the film Crazy Rich Asians, and loves the fact that it’s a
milestone for Asian representation in Western media. But many of her Indian
friends have told her that the way the film depicts South Asians is a problem.
Huifen has noticed that the only South Asian characters in the movie are
servants, but doesn’t see any problem with this. But she knows that lightskinned Chinese people like her tend to have moral blind spots when it comes
to racism and colourism in the Asian community, and have interests in
believing there’s nothing problematic about the film. Suspicious of herself,
Huifen suspends her immediate beliefs on the matter, and has the higherorder belief that her friends are more likely to be correct. Out of concern for
doing the right thing, she shares an article on Facebook, written by one of her
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friends, highlighting the racist aspects of the film.

Unlike Teresa and Chuck, Huifen lacks cognitive moral understanding of the reasons
why there’s anything morally problematic with Crazy Rich Asians. Because of her
unresponsiveness to moral reasons when it comes to racism and colourism in the
Asian community, she is incompetent at doing the right thing based on those
reasons. But because she recognises this, she uses her concern for doing the right
thing to perform the right action. Intuitively, her act of spreading awareness of the
issue on social media has some amount of moral worth.

3.3 Defending the contextual claim: part (ii)
According to the contextual claim about moral worth, it isn’t enough for reasonsunresponsive agents to be motivated by a concern for doing the right thing. For her
right act of ϕ-ing to have moral worth, she must also fulfil part (ii) of the claim. She
must be competent at ϕ-ing based on her concern for doing the right thing.
This is because agents who who are incompetent at acting for moral reasons,
but are motivated by doing a concern for doing the right thing, can accidentally
perform right actions. If not for part (ii) of the contextual claim, the claim would
incorrectly predict that these actions have moral worth. Consider the following case:

Reckless Uncertainty. Umar is at the ballot box deciding whether to vote to
abolish the death penalty. Although he wants to do the right thing, he can't
figure out what that is. A flash of divine intuition tells him that flipping a coin
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will reveal the right course of action. Based on the result of a coin toss, Umar
votes to abolish the death penalty.

Although Umar does the right thing, his action isn't morally worthy. He does the
right thing by accident, as a result of a reckless decision-making procedure. He
believes this is a good procedure, but it isn’t. Umar is incompetent at acting based on
his concern for doing the right thing. Without part (ii) of the contextual claim, his
action would incorrectly count as morally worthy, since he was motivated to act by a
concern for doing the right thing, and performed the right action.

3.4 Defending the contextual claim: contexts C
Here, I'll explain why I define the scope of the contextual claim as I do. Recall that
parts (i) and (ii) of the contextual claim only apply in contexts C, which are contexts
where an agent’s unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes
her incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons.
Why define C in terms of incompetence? Why not define C counterfactually,
and say that the relevant contexts are those in which an agent’s unresponsiveness to
moral reasons ‘would otherwise cause her to perform the wrong action’?
Again, the answer has to do with agents who accidentally perform the right
actions. An agent can be incompetent at acting for moral reasons, lack any concern
for doing the right thing, and nonetheless do the right thing by accident. The
contextual claim should allow us to assess the actions of such agents, and predict
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that their actions lack moral worth. Defining C counterfactually doesn’t allow us to
do this, and defining C in terms of incompetence does. Here’s an example:

Unsatisfied Temptation. Tammy is tired of her partner. At a party, she meets
Teresa, and is tempted to have an affair. Tammy judges that this would be
wrong on account of her partner's feelings, but she’s temporarily indifferent
to them. Sparks are flying, and they can both tell that the other party wants
the affair. Tammy is about to give in to her temptation. But before she makes
an explicit move, Teresa says, 'Let's not do this. I have a husband, and it
would be wrong.' Tammy rolls her eyes and walks away, deciding not to
pursue the matter any further.

Tammy shares important similarities with Teresa, from the original Temptation case.
Both of them are unmotivated by moral reasons. Both are also in a position to
perform a morally worthy action, by demonstrating a concern for doing the right
thing, and competently acting on this concern. It’s just that Teresa does, and Tammy
doesn’t. When we judge the moral worth of Tammy’s actions, we should hold them
up to the same standards as Teresa’s actions—that is, to the standards of parts (i) and
(ii) of the contextual claim.
Defining C counterfactually renders the contextual claim silent on agents like
Tammy. Her unresponsiveness to moral reasons would not have caused her to
perform the wrong action, since she doesn’t in fact perform the wrong action.
In contrast, defining C as contexts in which agents are incompetent at acting
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on the basis of moral reasons delivers not just a verdict, but the correct verdict that
Tammy’s actions lack moral worth. Tammy’s unresponsiveness to moral reasons
makes her incompetent at performing right actions on the basis of them. If not for
Teresa’s reluctance, Tammy would have initiated the affair of a disregard for her
partner’s feelings. Her doing the right thing is a lucky accident. The contextual
claim, where C is defined in terms of incompetence, correctly predicts that Tammy’s
right action has no moral worth.

3.5 Morally worthy action & pure moral deference
In the subsections above, I’ve argued for each component of the following claim:

The contextual claim about moral worth: In contexts C where an agent’s
unresponsiveness to the moral reasons why ϕ-ing is right makes her
incompetent at ϕ-ing on the basis of those moral reasons, her act of ϕ-ing has
moral worth if (i) she’s motivated to ϕ by a concern for doing the right thing,
and (ii) she’s competent at ϕ-ing based on this concern.

Now, I’ll explain how the contextual claim makes it possible for agents who
successfully practice pure moral deference to act on their deferential knowledge with
moral worth.
Recall Joel from our original Halloween case. Notice that he and his actions
fulfil the requirements of the contextual claim. First, Joel’s situation falls under the
category of contexts C. He’s unresponsive to the moral reasons why donning
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blackface for Halloween is wrong, and is incompetent at refraining from doing so on
the basis of those reasons. It’s only because of his TA’s moral testimony that he
makes the decision to do this. Second, Joel fulfils requirement (i) of the contextual
claim, by being motivated to refrain from donning blackface for Halloween by a
concern for doing the right thing.
Third, Joel fulfils requirement (ii) of the contextual claim: he is competent at
doing the right thing based on this concern. By successfully practicing pure moral
deference, he has demonstrated a competence at acquiring moral knowledge via
deference. His deferential moral knowledge is what spurs him to do the right thing.
So, his competence at acquiring moral knowledge via deference gives him the
competence to perform the right action based on a concern for doing the right thing,
when he acts on his deferential knowledge.
So, successfully practicing pure moral deference, and acting on deferential
knowledge, is one way of meeting all the requirements of the contextual claim about
moral worth. Just as Tammy’s, Chuck’s, and Huifen’s actions have moral worth, so
too does Joel’s choice not to don blackface for Halloween. This mitigates worries
about morally worthy action in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness
observation. When an agent who successfully defers ϕ-s on the basis of her
deferential moral knowledge, her act of ϕ-ing can have some amount of moral
worth.
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4

Virtues of acting & knowing for rightness' sake

In the previous section, I argued for the contextual claim about moral worth. I also
showed how the contextual claim mitigates worries about morally worthy action for
pure moral deference, in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness observation.
Now, I'll argue that the contextual claim implies that the following two moral
virtues exist:

The virtue of acting for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using her
concern for doing the right thing to perform right actions, in contexts where
because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using
her concern for doing the right thing to form moral knowledge, in contexts
where because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

Here’s a preliminary note about these virtues, similar to the one I made about the
contextual claim. My goal isn’t to argue that agents who exercise these two virtues
are being maximally virtuous. Some virtues are more ideal than others, in the sense
that they are virtues which would be possessed and exercised by ideal moral agents.
The virtues of acting and knowing for rightness’ sake don’t fit this bill, since they can
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only be exercised by flawed agents. Readers might worry that this means they can’t
legitimately count as virtues; I’ll address this worry in the conclusion.
I’ll start by arguing for these virtues in turn (4.1, 4.2). Then, I’ll explain how
they mitigate worries about virtue for pure moral deference in the face of the reasons
unresponsiveness observation, and also allows the epistemic act of deferring itself to
have moral worth (4.3).

4.1 The virtue of acting for rightness' sake
We've seen how cases of moral uncertainty are opportunities for agents to exercise
their concern for doing the right thing. Reckless Uncertainty was one such (failed)
case. Sepielli (2016) notes what morally uncertain agents should do:

'When you're confident enough about which considerations would render
your actions objectively right, you act directly on those considerations; but
when you're not confident, you ... aim for objective value itself. ... When I am
consciously uncertain about morality, it seems that I must either act on [a
responsible] uncertaintist norm, or else do an action that is not fully normguided ... [like] a "leap of faith". But, just intuitively, the motivations of an
agent in taking a leap of faith can hardly be called virtuous; such an agent
seems to be acting recklessly by her own lights. (Sepielli 2016, 11-12, emphasis
mine)49
49

The particular 'uncertaintist norm' that Sepielli's addressing is the practice of moral hedging. I
won't go into that debate here. But I'll point out that another wise uncertaintist decision-making
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Sepielli's quote here is instructive, in that it links virtue to the debate about acting for
moral reasons versus acting out of a concern for doing the right thing (acting on
’which considerations would render your actions objectively right' versus 'aiming for
objective value itself'). Sepielli (perhaps loosely) speaks of virtue as being a feature of
an agent's motives. In contrast, I think that virtues properly reside in the agent
herself. More specifically, a virtue is a moral competence an agent possesses, which
when exercised, confers moral worth upon her actions.
As we've seen in the previous section, this is precisely the type of competence
possessed and exercised by agents like Teresa from Temptation, Chuck from Changing
One’s Mind, and Huifen from Humility. The same goes for Joel, in the Halloween case
we started with. By fulfilling the standards of the contextual claim about moral
worth, they’ve signalled the following virtue:

The virtue of acting for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using her
concern for doing the right thing to perform right actions, in contexts where
because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

4.2

The virtue of knowing for rightness' sake

In addition to the virtue of acting for rightness' sake, we should also think a parallel
moral virtue exists for moral knowledge:

procedure is the practice of asking someone else what to do, where you have good reason to think
that this she'll make the right call.
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The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using
her concern for doing the right thing to form moral knowledge, in contexts
where because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

Unlike the virtue of acting for rightness' sake, this moral 'knowing-virtue' isn’t
exercised by Teresa and Chuck. They already know what the right thing is to do,
based on their cognitive grasp of moral reasons. Huifen doesn’t exercise this virtue
either, since she chooses to suspend judgment rather than believe her friends’
testimony. Joel is the only agent who exercises this virtue.
Here’s why we should think the virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake exists.
Just as good moral agents are competent at performing right actions, they’re also
competent at acquiring moral knowledge. One might think that ideally, this
competence should be manifested in the form of responsiveness to moral reasons.
Yet, just as it is in the domain of action, there are many contexts in which we are
epistemically unresponsive to moral reasons. This is true of Huifen, Umar, and Joel.
It’s important for moral agents to be good at acquiring moral knowledge in such
situations.
Importantly, the virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake is a moral virtue, and
not just an epistemic one. This is because moral knowledge, in addition to having
epistemic value, has moral value as well. One possibility is that moral knowledge is
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intrinsically morally valuable.50 I find this appealing, but it complicates the picture
and I won't discuss it here.51
Setting this aside, moral knowledge is certainly instrumental to a whole host of
other things which are themselves morally valuable. Having moral knowledge is a
useful epistemic attitude to adopt, as it is conducive to the following outcomes. (1)
First, having moral knowledge is valuable because it allows us to perform right
actions in a competent, morally worthy way. We’ve seen how Joel has used his moral
knowledge to competently refrain from donning blackface on Halloween. (2) Second,
having moral knowledge can help us become responsive to moral reasons in the
long run. There are many situations in which an agent, had she not first accepted
some true moral belief p, wouldn’t later have achieved cognitive moral
understanding of the moral reasons why p, fitting emotional responses to the
features generating moral reasons why p, fitting conative and motivational responses
towards these features, and so on. Cases of moral learning in children demonstrate
this the most clearly, but it’s easy to overlook that this frequently happens to adult
agents too. (3) Third, insofar as these responses to moral reasons are important for
other kinds of virtues, having moral knowledge can help us develop these virtues in
50

Suppose an agent is in a position to acquire a piece of moral knowledge, without being in a position
to acquire any other important good like cognitive moral understanding, affective reactions, and so
on. Such a view would hold that even if this agent would never be in a position to act on this piece of
moral knowledge, she would still be better off having it than not.
51
If moral knowledge is intrinsically valuable, this indicates the existence of quite a separate virtue
we might call virtue of ‘knowing for moral truths’ sake’: An agent’s competence at using her concern
for having moral knowledge to form moral knowledge, in contexts where because of her
unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be incompetent at doing so. Or, the value of both
the action-virtue and the knowing-virtue might really derive from a more fundamental value of
something like (roughly) ‘morality itself’.
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the long run too. (4) Fourth, insofar as these responses to moral reasons might help
us perform actions with more moral worth, having moral knowledge can help us to
achieve this too in the long run.
To be clear, moral knowledge isn’t the only epistemic attitude which is
conducive to the outcomes above. Consider Huifen. She lacks moral knowledge, but
adopts the epistemic attitude of believing that her friends are more likely to be
correct. This allows her to perform the right action in a competent, morally worthy
way. Realising that her friends are more likely to be correct might also spur her to
adopt an interrogative type of epistemic attitude, where she is motivated to
understand the reasons why there might be a problem with Crazy Rich Asians. It’s
enough, however, that having moral knowledge can play the same role as having
higher-order epistemic attitudes about what’s likely to be correct. So long as having
moral knowledge can play this causal role, it has moral value.
There are, however, some things that moral knowledge brings to the table that
other epistemic attitudes cannot. (5) For one, having moral knowledge allows agents
to competently perform sincere right actions. Epistemic attitudes which aren’t true,
justified, first-order moral beliefs can’t do this. Even though Huifen has done
something good, her act of sharing her friend’s article on Facebook still seems weird
—it isn’t completely sincere. It seems better for an action to be performed on the basis
of an agent’s actual beliefs, rather than, say, her higher-order assessment that the
action is likely to be right. It’s appropriate for Huifen’s friends to feel slighted. And
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this isn’t just because they know she has good reason to believe their testimony,
instead of suspending judgment. Consider the following case:

Monster in the Mines. Harvey has some serious childhood trauma. While
wandering into his father’s mines as a young boy, he saw a terrifying monster.
Harvey wants to return to the mines to see if the monster is still there. He tells
his girlfriend Sabrina about his plans. Unbeknownst to Harvey, Sabrina has a
good reason to think he’s right about what he saw: she’s a witch who’s seen
many supernatural creatures herself. Because revealing her secret to Harvey
would put him in danger, Sabrina pretends she doesn’t believe him. She raises
her eyebrows and says, ‘Well, you could be wrong, or you could be right. But
I fully support you. Let’s go into the mines together to confront what you
saw… or what you think you saw.’ Although Harvey feels grateful, he’s
mostly just annoyed. He says, ‘Thanks, but no thanks. I don’t need your help.’

Although it’s fitting for Harvey to feel grateful, it’s also fitting for him to feel
slighted. This is despite the fact that he doesn’t know that Sabrina has a good reason
to believe him, and despite the fact that he knows that what he’s saying sounds
crazy. From Harvey’s perspective, Sabrina’s offer to accompany him to confront his
trauma isn’t sincere, since she appears not to believe that he really saw a monster in
the mines. Her claim that she fully supports him doesn’t appear to be sincere either.
Sabrina is being patronising to Harvey. From his perspective, it would be better for
her to accompany him into the mines out of a full-blooded, sincere belief that he’d
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really seen a monster.
Agents like Huifen and Sabrina demonstrate how moral knowledge brings
something to the table that other epistemic attitudes can’t. This is because merely
performing right actions without knowing, or at least believing, that they’re true
doesn’t allow us to be sincere. The value of sincerity might be cashed out in various
ways. One plausible way is to hold, as many of us do, that sincerity itself is a
virtue.52 If so, then Huifen’s act of sharing her friend’s article would be more morally
worthy, and would have signalled more virtue, had it stemmed from moral
knowledge rather than her higher-order probabilistic assessment.

4.3

Virtuous pure moral deference

To recap, I’ve argued for these two virtues in the subsections above:

The virtue of acting for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using her
concern for doing the right thing to perform right actions, in contexts where
because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be
incompetent at doing so.

The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake: An agent’s competence at using
her concern for doing the right thing to form moral knowledge, in contexts
where because of her unresponsiveness to moral reasons, she’d otherwise be

52

Or, more precisely, that an agent’s competence at acting (and speaking, communicating, etc.) in
accordance with her actual beliefs is a virtue.
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incompetent at doing so.

If these virtues exist, it’s easy to see how agents who successfully practice pure
moral deference, and act on their deferential moral knowledge, are signalling virtue.
This mitigates worries about virtue for pure moral deference in the face of the
reasons unresponsiveness observation.
The first reason is that acting on deferential moral knowledge is a way of
exercising the virtue of acting for rightness’ sake. Joel has done this, by deferring to
his TA’s testimony that donning blackface for Halloween is wrong, and then acting
on his newfound moral knowledge. The second reason is that the very epistemic act
of successfully practicing pure moral deference is a way of exercising the virtue of
knowing for rightness’ sake. Joel has done this with his very act of deferring to his
TA’s testimony, in the competent way that he has. When Joel defers, and acts on his
deferential knowledge, he is signalling virtue after all.
The virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake also helps to mitigate the separate
worry about moral worth in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness observation. In
Section 3, I argued that acting on deferential moral knowledge can be morally
worthy. But the virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake means that the very act of
epistemically deferring can be morally worthy too. This is because actions produced
by exercising virtues have moral worth. When an agent successfully practices pure
moral deference, and exercises the virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake, her act of
deferring has moral worth.
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5

Conclusion

The main goal of this paper was to vindicate pure moral deference, and agents who
defer, in the face of the reasons unresponsiveness observation. I’ve done this in
Sections 3 and 4, by showing how agents who successfully defer can perform actions
with moral worth, and signal virtue.
Let’s return to the case of Halloween we started with. What I’ve argued for
delivers the following verdicts. When Joel defers to his TA’s say-so and acquires
moral knowledge that donning blackface for Halloween is wrong, he exercises the
virtue of knowing for rightness’ sake, and his act of deference itself is morally
worthy. When Joel acts on his deferential belief by refraining to don blackface for
Halloween, he exercises the virtue of acting for rightness’ sake, and this deferential
action has moral worth too. Joel isn’t perfect: he isn’t acting with full moral worth,
and he isn’t exhibiting ideal virtues and being maximally virtuous. Still, it isn’t as if
he’s acting with no moral worth and signalling no virtue at all.
I’ll wrap up by responding to some potential objections to my account.

(1) Objection: The virtues of knowing and acting for rightness’ sake can’t be real
virtues, since they presuppose an existing flaw in the agent.
Response: The first thing to note is that this presupposes a view of virtue that’s
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far too demanding. Perhaps the ideal moral agent is always responsive to moral
reasons, in all possible valuable ways, with respect to all possible moral questions.
But why peg our standards for virtue to such an agent? As a matter of fact, it’s
impossible for human agents to achieve this ideal, owing to our cognitive, emotional,
and even neurobiological limitations. Moreover, as I argue in the chapters before
this, the limited nature of our experiences place severe limits on our moral epistemic
capacities, often through no fault of our own. In light of this, our standards for virtue
cannot possibly be that high.53 And the idea that our standards for virtue can’t be
pegged to absolute perfection isn’t new. The ancient Stoics, for instance, held that the
standard of Sage, all of whose actions are fully virtuous, is the highest standard
achievable by finite, imperfect, and limited agents.
Moreover, the fact that virtues can presuppose existing flaws in agents is,
really, a positively good thing. Our flaws don’t render us utterly helpless: we can
adopt wise, morally valuable strategies that help us do the right things in spite of
them. This includes having a standing concern for doing the right thing in itself, and
being competent at gaining moral knowledge via social practices like pure moral
deference. By acknowledging the essentially non-ideal nature of human moral
agents, my account gives us space to strive towards becoming good non-ideal moral
agents.

53

The idea that our standards for virtue can’t be pegged to absolute perfection isn’t new. The Stoics,
for instance, held that the standard of the Sage, all of whose actions are fully virtuous, is the ‘highest
standard achievable by finite, imperfect, and limited’ agents (Vazquez MS, emphasis mine).
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(2) Objection: My account makes virtue and moral worth too cheap.
Response: The virtues of knowing and acting for rightness’ sake are actually
very demanding. The moral worth that comes with exercising these virtues doesn’t
come easily. Being competent at acquiring moral knowledge via testimony involves
meeting substantive moral and epistemic demands.
First, agents must be competent at identifying moral experts. Consider Joel.
One reason why he justifiably trusts his TA is that he’s been able to grasp her
explanations in the past. This presupposes that he’s already competent, to a
substantial degree, at responding to moral reasons. Sliwa (2017) notes that without
some moral competence of our own, we can’t judge the moral competence of others
(551). Second, one needs to be able to identify moral experts who are trustworthy.
Sliwa notes again that one needs to be sensitive to traits like sincerity, integrity, a
concern for helping others, and so on (551).
Third, in order to possess and exercise the virtues of knowing and acting for
rightness’ sake, an agent has to be competent at identifying contexts in which she’s
unresponsive to moral reasons, and thus incompetent at performing right actions on
the basis of those reasons. This involves knowing what one’s moral blind spots are.
This is easy when you’re consciously uncertain about some matter: Umar, for
instance, knows that he’s unresponsive to moral reasons, since he knows that he
can’t figure things out on his own. But knowing that you have a moral blind spot is
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much more difficult when you’re responsive to illusory moral reasons, responsive to
moral reasons in the wrong way, or lack knowledge altogether that there are moral
reasons you aren’t responding to. Consider Huifen. She knows that her privileged
social location makes her bad at responding to moral reasons with respect to racism
in the Asian community. This is not an easy realisation to come to. Moreover, many
others in her position would be biased towards positively thinking that they have
cognitive moral understanding of why the negative representation of South Asians
in Crazy Rich Asians is not morally problematic. Such agents, for example, might
take the fact that South Asians are indeed often servants in Singapore as a moral
reason to think that there is nothing wrong with the film. It would be even harder for
such agents to recognise that their convictions might be false.
Fourth, agents in these positions have to know who to defer to in order to
acquire moral knowledge. Knowing who to believe is even harder when you’re
flying blind. Deferring to members of oppressed groups with respect to certain
matters, as Huifen has done, isn’t an immediately obvious strategy to many people
in socially privileged positions.

The two objections above were ones levelled at specific details of my account. Now,
I’ll respond to two objections are ones levelled at optimistic accounts of pure moral
deference in general.
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(3) Objection: Optimistic accounts of pure moral deference, like mine, license
epistemic laziness. If we’re permitted to defer, what would be the problem with
doing so all the time?
Response: My account doesn’t license epistemic laziness. Consider the
following case, which is presumably one that this type of objection worries about:

Competent But Lazy. I’m wondering whether the collective action problem of
factory farming makes it morally permissible for me to eat meat. I could
probably figure this out on my own. I’m a competent philosophy PhD
student, and emotionally sensitive to non-human animals. I have extra reason
to think I have it in me, because something I wrote years ago on the topic was
published in a food ethics textbook. I've just completely forgotten what my
arguments and conclusions were, as I've since moved on to epistemology. I’m
tired of thinking about animals. So, I ask my morally reliable, trustworthy
friend Eilidh whether I’m permitted to eat meat in the face of the collective
action problem. She tells me that it isn't. I justifiably accept this true belief,
and now have moral knowledge. I don't think about the issue any further.

What I’ve done seems at least distasteful. Fortunately, my particular account doesn’t
condone this type of epistemic laziness. The virtues I’ve argued for are contextual, in
the sense that they only apply when the agent is in a very bad position to acquire
moral knowledge on her own. My account doesn’t imply that we can outsource our
moral beliefs to others when we are in good positions to form moral knowledge by
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ourselves. If one thinks that knowing and acting in response to moral reasons is
valuable, then one can agree with my account, while holding that it would be much
better of me to figure things out on my own.

(4) Objection: Agents who practice pure moral deference will tend to end up with a
bunch of bare moral knowledge, but not much else.
Response: This worry is unfounded. Nothing about my account implies that
after we defer, it isn’t then desirable to then attempt to achieve goods like cognitive
moral understanding, fitting affect, desires, motivations, and so on. I agree that this
is true, since having these goods brings us closer to being an ideal moral agent. But
where I disagree with philosophers like Hills is the order in which it’s appropriate to
acquire moral knowledge and these other moral goods. Hills’ rule of thumb is that
moral agents should acquire cognitive moral understanding of the reasons why p,
before believing and hence knowing that p. But in many contexts, I think it’s
perfectly acceptable for us to do things the other way around. We can justifiably
accept a belief via testimony in order to form moral knowledge, and then proceed to
acquire cognitive moral understanding, and other moral goods like affect, desires,
and motivations.
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